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Garry Kasparov is the founder and chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move.

Last week, I was in Poland on a personal diplomatic mission. I met the president, the foreign minister, a former prime minister, and the mayor of Warsaw. My goal was simple: strengthen a coalition for Ukrainian victory and against Russian imperialism.

On its face, that task might appear straightforward, especially in a place like Poland. As I’ll explain, things are never so simple.

Like the Ukrainians, Poles have also experienced the bitter taste of Russian imperialism for generations. Tragedies like the Katyn massacre—the murder of nearly 22,000 Polish officers by the Red Army—are seared into the Polish national consciousness. The Soviets invaded Poland along with the Nazis in 1939, and Poles lived under a Soviet-backed communist dictatorship for nearly half a century after the war.

All of that means a basic understanding of the Russian threat is baked into Poles’ DNA. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Poland stepped up to provide critical aid. The Polish government has provided the Ukrainian military with more tanks than any other country. Meanwhile, Poland hosts nearly a million Ukrainian refugees, making it the number two destination for people fleeing the Russian invasion.

The sudden arrival of such a large foreign population naturally puts a strain on even the most harmonious relationships. Polish law enforcement have reported an uptick in xenophobic attacks on Ukrainians, occurring everywhere from a construction site where refugees work to the schoolyard where their children play.

Add to this the fact that Poland and Ukraine have their own complicated backstory. Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently designated a Ukrainian military unit as “Heroes of the UPA”—the World War II-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army. To Ukrainians, the UPA are freedom fighters who resisted Soviet-Russian colonization. Poles remember the UPA as the villains behind the murder of their countrymen in the borderlands between Poland and the USSR. Americans may be accustomed to viewing World War II as a binary conflict, but many Central and Eastern European nations were caught between the twin evils of communism and fascism.

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In July, videos of Polish men beating a young Ukrainian couple went viral. There have been calls for an end to military aid to Ukraine until Zelenskyy withdraws the UPA honor. Lech Walesa, the heroic dissident and Poland’s first post-communist president, removed a Ukrainian flag pin from his chest. Walesa had worn the pin from the beginning of Russia’s invasion, and had previously lobbied the US government to provide more support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the current president, Karol Nawrocki, rescinded Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, the highest award conferred by the Polish government.

Tensions about refugees and history are now feeding off of each other. Anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Poland is at its highest point since the full-scale invasion began.

This is the complex situation into which I stepped. I met with President Nawrocki, who’s affiliated with the right-wing Law and Justice party, and I met with Warsaw Mayor Trzaskowski from the liberal Civic Coalition (Trzakowski ran against Nawrocki in the last presidential election). I saw my friend, Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski of the Civic Coalition, and I shared a long conversation with former Prime Minister Mateusz Moriawecki, who led a Law and Justice government for six years. Now he’s launching a new political party that he describes as “the most lefty of the righties.” Anyway, I was not in Poland to pick sides; I was there to repair a coalition that spans the political spectrum.

My message was clear: Whatever Poland’s historical differences with Ukraine, they share a common enemy in Russia now, and the alliance between Warsaw and Kyiv is essential for both. A Russian missile landed on Polish territory during my stay, putting a very fine point on that argument. Vladimir Putin is actively probing NATO’s defenses, and I believe an open attack on an alliance member— probably one of the Baltics—is coming soon.

Of course, many friends of Ukraine would also humbly advise that Kyiv practice a bit of pragmatism in its dealings with Poland. Nevertheless, the priority should remain the same. Poles and Ukrainians might look to fellow democracies Japan and South Korea for inspiration. Tokyo and Seoul are finally rekindling their relationship despite a painful history because the threat from North Korea and China is too immediate to suffer decades-old distractions.

Americans, too, should consider what it means to prioritize and build a broad coalition for Ukraine. Zelenskyy recently caught flack from left-wing pundits like Mehdi Hasan for taking an interview with MAGA influencer Laura Loomer, who previously parroted the pro-Russian line. It’s certainly fair to question the motivations behind Loomer’s about face—grifters tend to follow the money. But people in the Ukrainians’ position can’t afford to pick and choose. The truth is that I don’t even agree with my Polish hosts on every single issue, but those private disagreements are unimportant. If Loomer’s conversion in turn converts her followers on the American right, then it will have been worth it. New recruits in the global fight for freedom over tyranny are always welcome.

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Issac Luna (Olvera) is a former US Marine Corps officer who fought for the Ukrainian military after the full-scale Russian invasion. He is the author of the book Reckoning Dreams and Fire, a memoir about his experience in Ukraine and other battles. Mr. Luna remains based in Ukraine. Follow him on X.

In March of this year, a few dozen people gathered in Moscow to protest. They weren’t speaking out against Russia’s criminal war against Ukraine; they were demonstrating against Internet restrictions in their own country. This act of self-expression was short-lived: 13 people were taken into custody

Meanwhile, for the last two weeks, in Kyiv and in every other major Ukrainian city, thousands have been protesting. Police stand nearby, calmly keeping watch. No one is arrested. In fact, many off-duty police officers are among the protesters.

Ukrainians are showing up to demonstrate against the removal of Mykhailo Fedorov, a young, reform-minded politician, from the post of minister of defense.

All of this is taking place under martial law, which grants governments expanded emergency powers needed to confront a declared threat. In Ukraine this means men aged 23 to 60 are barred from leaving the country, mass conscription, and curfews in most cities, including Kyiv. Ukrainians have endured these extraordinary restrictions for a reason: to protect their democracy. That’s why a US Marine veteran like me volunteered to serve in the Ukrainian military in the very first days of the full-scale invasion. Now Ukrainians are hitting the streets en masse for the same reason—to safeguard their freedom—and I had the privilege of joining them.

The ousted defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, is 35. A former tech entrepreneur, he’s spent nearly a decade in government, charismatic and untainted by the oligarch politics or scandals that have dogged Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s administration. Some protest signs even depict Fedorov as a saint, Byzantine-style.

Fedorov rose to prominence leading Ukraine’s digital transformation, moving services like passport applications, birth registrations, and marriage licenses online, providing a lifeline for millions displaced by war, and a system that cuts down on bribery by removing face-to-face contact and leaving an auditable digital trail.

Fedorov then got an unlikely promotion: minister of defense. With no military experience, and just old enough to be battalion commander, many were skeptical, myself included.

In Ukraine, many top commanders came from civilian careers, bringing ideas that often challenge the military orthodoxy. Robert “Magyar” Brovdi is one such individual: a man with a distinctively unkempt beard. He was a grain trader until 2022, but joined the military when Russia invaded. He pioneered Ukraine’s drone program and leads the equivalent of a brigade as a major. The deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force is a colonel with only five years of military experience. He was a TV producer before that. So the decision to put Fedorov in the top military job was less radical than in countries where business-as-usual rules apply.

Still, Fedorov’s appointment unsettled some in the traditional military establishment. He reportedly clashed with the commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, a general associated with the Soviet old guard that often favors costly conventional ground assaults.

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On paper, the Soviet-style doctrine disadvantages a smaller, less-well-equipped country like Ukraine. On the other hand—to be fair to Syrskyi—I am a NATO-trained former infantry officer, and I recognize that an old-school ground assault is often the only option.

Syrskyi pulled off incredible feats: the defense of Kyiv, the Kharkiv counteroffensive, and even an incursion into Russia. The front has been mostly stable. His imperfect approach deserves credit, but he does not enjoy the popularity and sterling reputation of Fedorov (a high bar).

During my service with the US Marine Corps, my instructors often said, “Don’t send a Marine where you can send a bullet first.”

Fedorov embraced a similar philosophy: don’t send a soldier where you can send a robot first.

With that mentality, he moved quickly, which is what the situation demanded. He coordinated with Elon Musk to block Russia’s access to Starlink. He also accelerated the deployment of cheap drones and ground robots, an asymmetric strategy that spared Ukrainian lives while killing Russians faster than Moscow could replace them. After uncovering overspending, he introduced polygraph testing for employees and implemented a more competitive and transparent procurement process.

Many credit Fedorov for turning the tide in the war. During his tenure, Ukraine recovered more land than it lost, disrupted Russian logistics in Crimea, intensified strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure, triggering a fuel crisis, and decimated Russia’s shadow fleet in the Sea of Azov.

The pace of reforms was not fast enough for Fedorov, but it was too jarring for the establishment. Fedorov accused Syrskyi of slow rolling key reforms and urged Zelenskyy to replace him. Instead, six months into the job, President Zelenskyy fired the tech visionary and kept the military traditionalist.

The decision caused an immediate public uproar. Thousands of Ukrainians, carrying cardboard signs, marched toward the presidential complex along the well-worn path Ukrainians have used to express mass anger: in the revolutions of 2004 and 2014, and most recently in 2025, when crowds demanded the independence of anti–corruption institutions.

Many rank-and-file soldiers opposed Fedorov’s dismissal. In most countries soldiers can’t publicly protest against their chain of command. Ukraine is different because the situation here is unlike any in the world.

Many of Ukraine’s nearly one million soldiers were civilians not too long ago, and they remain engaged in issues that affect their very survival. They often show up to protests in civilian clothing. The military doesn’t try too hard to prevent it.

This was different. A Ukrainian friend, Alex, was an IT manager, until he was drafted over a year ago. He had planned to attend the protest but he heard soldiers who joined might face punishment, so he stayed home

Nevertheless, his interests were well represented. My fiancé’s sign featured a popular slogan: “I am here for those who are there [on the front].”

It is more than a slogan. I asked a young woman behind me why she had come. She opposed the president’s decision, and she was particularly motivated because her own father is fighting. It’s a strangely beautiful symbiotic relationship. The protesters were fighting for those who fight for them.

The crowds gathered daily and haven’t stopped. Their signs captured the mood: “You finally have such good cards, and you decided to play the fool.”

Another said “Help the president understand what is more effective: drones or shovels?” with a photo of Syrskyi next to a shovel.

The consensus was unambiguous: yes to Fedorov, no to Syrskyi.

I’m not Ukrainian so I’m not entitled to make demands, but I’m not indifferent to the events or its outcome.

In 2022, I left my life in the United States to fight in the Ukrainian army because I believed Ukraine deserved support as it defended its democracy against an autocratic invasion. And I’ve been inspired by their resolve since then.

Democracy is an active verb, so I came to the square to see if the country is moving in the right direction. And I am inspired once again. No one is being shot by the Ukrainian security service. No one is being arrested. In the middle of a war, under martial law, between air raid alarms, brigades of mostly young Ukrainians marched toward the president’s compound to make demands. That would not happen in Russia.

And it is working. Ukraine is no dictatorship. Its president is responsive to public demands under the most trying circumstances. After six days of the protests, Zelenskyy dismissed the unpopular general, Syrskyi. Stepping into the role of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is Mykhailo Drapatyi, a respected 45-year-old who started this war as a battalion commander. Unlike Syrskyi, with no connection to the Soviet legacy and the old guard.

It was another massive victory for the Ukrainian people, just as they won when they protested last year to restore the independence of a government anti-corruption watchdog.

The story isn’t fully resolved, though. Fedorov hasn’t been reinstated. Zelenskyy offered him other roles, including something akin to a national security adviser post, which he reportedly declined (along with offers from Palantir and the Italian government). Negotiations continue, but Ukrainians themselves are the catalysts and the brokers of this process.

More photos from the protests:

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Garry Kasparov is the chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move.

The country of my birth no longer exists, and on Saturday, my adoptive country will be 250 years old. The American republic has outlasted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics more than three times over. On the occasion of the Fourth of July, I’d like to offer some reflections on its meaning to this Russian.

It would be easy for me to say that, growing up in the communist system during the Cold War, I was conditioned to hate America. But this would be greatly oversimplifying things. The truth is that the America of my Soviet upbringing was both distant and extremely close. The United States was at once the object of vicious propaganda and grudging admiration verging upon envy.

I remember how official Soviet attitudes toward the United States charted a sort of schizophrenic course. The Kremlin attacked the US in the present for segregation and “capitalist hypocrisy” while also hailing America’s revolutionary pedigree.

Vladimir Lenin even acclaimed the American breakup with Great Britain as “a model of a revolutionary war.” During Joseph Stalin’s later reign, one Soviet historian praised the Declaration of Independence as “a progressive document of its time.”

1776 remained almost untouchable in the USSR. It’s a historical irony that today’s American far left holds the founders in lower regard than Soviet Communist Party ideologues, who could not help but respect the rebels who humbled the imperialists in London.

My own Soviet education was… unorthodox. There was the influence of the Jewish side of my family, who were highly critical of the Soviet regime. As a chess player, I also had far more access to the West than my comrades, so I approached America with extra curiosity and reverence. I devoured as much information as I could about the USA before I even visited the place.

On the sidelines of a Brussels tournament in 1986, I approached grandmaster Nigel Short, a Brit, with a friendly trivia exercise. He had to name at least 10 of the 15 Soviet republics, and I would have to list off at least 40 of 50 US states. Nigel, who’d been to the Soviet Union, struggled to identify two thirds of its provinces, but I proudly exceeded my minimum with 42 American states named (apologies to the people of Tennessee, I have a strong recollection that I forgot to call out the Volunteer State!).

I finally made it to the US in 1988, stopping in New York and DC. That trip was a whirlwind. The energy of American democracy was magnetic even to a non-American like me, but it took me a while to find my footing in US politics. I’d seen Ronald Reagan demand Mikhail Gorbachev tear down the Berlin Wall, and I wanted to belong to whatever movement the fortieth president represented. Yet, just a few years later, I watched as the first President Bush took pains to appease the Soviets. Just months before the USSR collapsed, he warned Ukrainians not to declare independence. In that moment, George Bush sounded a bit like King George III.

I am also socially liberal, and I found certain areas of agreement with Democrats. Ultimately, however, I decided that my path would be non-partisan and independent. Yet the novelty of a political system with more than one party, a system where not joining a party was also an option, will remain exciting for this child of the Soviet Union for as long as I live.

I carried my enthusiasm for America back to post-Soviet Russia with hope for a blank slate upon which to plant the self-evident truths about human freedom to which I’d been exposed.

You and I both know what came next. After years of protest, an arrest, and several friends jailed and murdered, I decided that my campaign against Vladimir Putin’s KGB regime would be most effectively waged outside of Russia’s borders. Fighting a ruthless dictator, where better to go than America? This is a country founded by people who pledged to one another “our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.”

All of that dynamism goes back to the Declaration, a blueprint for colonies reconstituted as “Free and Independent States.” America’s founding charter continues to be the model for liberation movements the world over. Declarations of independence from Korea to Kosovo have borrowed from language crafted two and a half centuries ago in Philadelphia.

It was for this reason that the United States of America stood apart in Soviet propaganda from Russia’s traditional rivals in Europe. Like the USSR, the USA was a country built upon an ideal, a new society. In this respect, America was not so much an immortal enemy as a fellow revolutionary state that had lost its way.

In reality, of course, it was the Soviets and their successors who constantly betrayed the principles of universal human rights. America is far from perfect, but for decades, its story was one of ever-expanding liberty. In Russia, the trajectory was one of instability, stagnation, and authoritarian decline.

Still, there are no fixed patterns in history. America’s continued success and openness are not guaranteed. For many Americans, this milestone Fourth of July may pass by as a kind of dull pain, a celebration seen as tone deaf amid the constant stream of insults and abuses flowing from the White House.

I am pushing back against the impulse to despair, and I appeal to you to do the same. America was the inspiration of my youth, and it has been my safe haven in more recent years. My wife and children are American citizens—thank goodness, by the way, for the Supreme Court’s ruling on birthright citizenship!

Ensuring this country’s future for the next 250 years and beyond means staking a claim to a proud legacy that goes back to July 4, 1776. Do not cede it to demagogues and extremists. Recognize that if you have something to lose, then you have something to fight for.

Happy Independence Day!

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Max Mottola is a communications intern at the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move. He is a student at the University of Chicago, where he is studying political science and economics.

Hanna Liubakova is a Belarusian journalist and political analyst. She is a nonresident senior fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Liubakova was sentenced in absentia to ten years in prison by the Belarusian regime for her journalistic work and is wanted across the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Belarus has frequently been described as the “last dictatorship in Europe.” The country, wedged between Poland, Ukraine, Russia, and the Baltics, doesn’t make the news as often as its neighbors, but it’s the site of an ongoing fight for freedom between an embattled opposition and the three-decade regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The government violently suppressed protests after a disputed election in 2020 and has joined Vladimir Putin as an accomplice in the invasion of Ukraine.

Yet since July 2024, Belarus has released approximately 850 political prisoners, including Maria Kalesnikava, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, and activist Siarhei Tsikhanouski, whose wife, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, ran against Lukashenka in the 2020 election.

The US brokered several prisoner release deals in exchange for sanctions relief on Belavia, Belarus’s national airline, and on potash, a key ingredient in fertilizer. These deals mark a thaw in diplomacy between Belarus and the West after years of isolation.

The prisoner releases present a human rights mirage, obscuring the Belarusian regime’s continued repression. Instead of an opening in the country’s political system, the Lukashenka government has created a revolving door of political persecution, releasing some critics while imprisoning others. Today, human rights groups estimate that over 1,100 opposition figures remain behind bars.

Will Western democracies fall for this ruse? US President Donald Trump, who called Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka “well respected” and “a powerful leader,” reportedly reached an agreement with the strongman for the release of up to 1,300 prisoners. That was in August 2025. Belarus has still not met its obligations.

To cut through the noise, I spoke with Hanna Liubakova, a Belarusian journalist and political dissident wanted by the regime.

Before we dive into the conversation, a note on language. At the interviewee’s request, the Belarusian President will be referred to by his Belarusian name, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, rather than Alexander Lukashenko, the Russified version more commonly used in Western outlets. This reflects the will of the Belarusian resistance movement, whose members vehemently oppose Lukashenka’s crackdown on the use of the Belarusian language. Belarusian was the sole official language of Belarus when it became independent of the USSR and remained so until 1995, when Lukashenka called a referendum to give the Russian language official status. While Belarusian and Russian are nominally co-equal, the Belarusian language has been largely sidelined in many spheres of daily life, while Lukashenka has criminalized other symbols of Belarusian nationalism. In the same referendum that elevated the Russian language, Lukashenka also revoked the white-red-white Belarusian national flag in favor of a near-exact copy of the flag of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic—only with the communist hammer and sickle removed.

Max Mottola, The Next Move: Belarus has freed thousands of dissidents in exchange for lifted sanctions in a series of deals with the US. Why has Lukashenka opened negotiations with the Trump administration?

Hanna Liubakova: First, it is important to acknowledge the results. The American delegation, including Special Envoy John Coale and State Department representatives, has helped secure the release of hundreds of political prisoners. That is a significant achievement, and it is deeply appreciated by everyone.

As for why Lukashenka has become more open to negotiations with the US, I think there are several factors.

First, the Belarusian regime likely sees the current administration as more pragmatic and transactional, and therefore more open to making deals. Second, there is a history of engagement with the first Trump administration. Before the 2020 Belarusian presidential election, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Minsk, demonstrating that dialogue between Washington and Minsk was possible. That experience may have made Lukashenka more willing to engage again.

We should also look at the broader context. After the large prisoner exchange between Russia and the West in the summer of 2024, we saw similar discussions begin involving Belarus. At the same time, the regime has had to adapt to changing geopolitical and economic realities. Lukashenka has always sought to balance different centers of power and reduce his isolation when possible.

In many ways, this approach is not new. Throughout his political career, Lukashenka has repeatedly used political prisoners as bargaining chips in exchange for political benefits, sanctions relief, diplomatic engagement, or broader international recognition.

TNM: Do you think that these deals and Trump’s praise boost Lukashenka’s reputation and global standing?

HL: As for whether these contacts legitimize Lukashenka, I think the answer is more complicated.

Of course, many Belarusians are uncomfortable with language that refers to Lukashenka as a “president” or a “well-respected person.” Many of us do not call him president because he has remained in power through repression and electoral fraud.

At the same time, I do not think the primary purpose of such language is to legitimize him. My assumption is that it is part of a broader negotiation strategy aimed at securing the release of political prisoners.

The more important question is whether engagement produces results. So far, it has led to the release of hundreds of people. That is a real and tangible outcome.

At the same time, we should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Political prisoners continue to be arrested, repression continues, and the regime has not fundamentally changed its behavior. Any engagement with Lukashenka should remain focused on concrete results and should not be mistaken for political normalization.

TNM: Lukashenka came in as a virulently anti-Western figure. In neighboring Ukraine, Russian hostility has forced significant cultural, economic, and political realignment, as seen in Kyiv’s efforts to join the EU. Is a rapprochement with the West possible in Belarus with the country constrained by a Putin-friendly regime?

HL: I do not believe that Lukashenka will fundamentally change his ideological position. There is a common myth that he has been “balancing” between the West and Russia as a way of staying in power. In reality, he has also been balancing within his dependence on Russia—using limited engagement with the West primarily as leverage for his deals with Moscow.

Before 2020 and before the waiving of sanctions, Belarus did maintain relatively open relations with the US, the EU, and Ukraine. However, when Lukashenka faced his most serious political crisis during the mass protests in 2020, he turned to Russia for support. Putin provided it at a critical moment for his regime’s survival.

There have been cycles in this relationship: periods of tactical engagement with the West, followed by repression and sanctions, and then renewed reliance on Russia when Lukashenka feels threatened. This pattern has been consistent for decades. The difference now is not the logic itself, but the constraints. Since 2020—and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the regime has far less room to maneuver. Its dependence on Russia has deepened, and its ability to pursue any meaningful balancing strategy has significantly narrowed.

At the same time, Lukashenka’s outreach to countries like China is both an economic necessity and a political attempt to signal that Belarus is not entirely without alternatives, even if those alternatives remain limited. This is also done to improve his position in conversations with Putin.

Ideology also matters. Lukashenka and Putin may not be best friends, but they are allies. The 1999 Union State Treaty was not imposed on Lukashenka. It was a choice that laid the groundwork for deeper long-term integration with Russia.

Given this trajectory, I do not see the current regime voluntarily pivoting toward the EU in any meaningful sense, except in a purely transactional way—if limited engagement helps reduce sanctions or unlock economic benefits. But this is not democratization or liberal reform. After more than 30 years in power, the system is structurally resistant to change. We should not expect a late-stage ideological transformation.

That said, it is important not to overlook Belarusian society. Even under repression, public moods matter. Many Belarusians want their country to be more open, less isolated, and more economically connected to Europe. This creates a form of internal pressure that the regime cannot fully ignore, even if it cannot be expressed politically. The West should keep this societal dimension in mind when assessing Belarus: the regime is constrained not only by Russia, but also by the long-term preferences of its own population.

TNM: How have Lukashenka’s efforts to direct migrants toward Lithuania, Poland, and other Eastern European countries, in what has been dubbed “migrant warfare,” affected European integration?

HL: The migration crisis was clearly orchestrated. The peak came in 2021, when thousands of migrants appeared at the EU’s borders with Belarus. Multiple investigations have documented efforts by organizations linked to the Belarusian regime to bring people into the country and facilitate their movement toward the borders of Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia. Given the level of control exercised by the Belarusian authorities, it is difficult to believe that thousands of people could have been transported to border areas without the regime’s knowledge. The regime was clearly aware of what was happening.

The goal was to pressure and blackmail the EU into easing sanctions and re-engaging with Lukashenka politically. He wanted the EU and Western governments to see him as both a troublemaker and someone they would ultimately need to talk to. He expected phone calls, meetings, and renewed diplomatic engagement as a way out of his international isolation.

There were, in fact, two phone calls from former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, she was already preparing to leave office, and the calls did not result in any meaningful political rehabilitation for Lukashenka. While he may have viewed the contacts as a success, the broader strategy failed. The EU did not lift sanctions. On the contrary, it adopted additional sanctions packages in response to the crisis.

That was the correct response. The EU demonstrated that it would not be blackmailed.

The situation has not completely disappeared. Attempts to cross the EU’s eastern borders from Belarus continue, with numbers fluctuating from month to month. What is striking is how closely these flows appear to correspond with political developments. For example, periods of communication between Belarus and Poland have sometimes coincided with a decline in attempted crossings. This suggests a high degree of control over the movement of migrants and the ability to redirect pressure toward different borders when desired.

What makes the situation especially cynical is that human beings are being used as instruments of political pressure. People have suffered, and some have died along the border. Given the regime’s extensive control over the country, I find it difficult to believe that the appearance of migrants was beyond its control.

We also have evidence that organizations connected to the regime promoted Belarus as a transit route to the EU, helped facilitate visas, and encouraged people to travel there under false expectations. In my view, this amounts to state-enabled human trafficking being used as a tool of political coercion.

TNM: Over the years, the West has tried to support pro-democracy opposition figures in Belarus. Does that possibility still remain?

HL: The Belarusian pro-democracy movement was not “created” by the West or built around a pre-selected leader. It emerged from a domestic political crisis in 2020, when a presidential candidate became a focal point for mass protest and was later forced into exile. Since then, Western support has primarily gone to institutions—independent media, civil society, and democratic representation abroad—rather than shaping leadership itself.

For ordinary people in Belarus, the issue is about basic conditions of life: stability, safety, and the ability to travel, earn, and live without fear. In that sense, the political debate is often less about ideology and more about whether the state can deliver normality and predictability.

Since 2020, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has become a central coordinating figure for the democratic movement in exile, recognized internationally and working with a range of political and civil society actors. That role is real, but it exists alongside ongoing internal diversity and disagreement within the broader opposition ecosystem. But what is important is that there is a broad consensus within the Belarusian democratic movement on the end goal: a democratic, independent Belarus with free elections, rule of law, and accountable institutions.

TNM: What are the chances that Russia will try to replace Lukashenka with a more pliant figure?

HL: I don’t think there is anyone in Belarus who is more useful to Russia than Lukashenka. Putin knows who Lukashenka is and how to work with him. Lukashenka maintains control over the economy, the security apparatus, and the political system, and from the Kremlin’s view, he delivers what Russia needs.

I think it’s a myth that we’ve been talking about for decades that Putin is willing to have somebody else. What are the signs of that? Lukashenka meets with Putin more than anyone else and vice versa so there is a connection that exists there. There are no signals that Putin would like to replace him.

Some continue to speculate about Russian pressure on Belarus to send troops into Ukraine. Russia is certainly using Belarusian territory, infrastructure, and military assets to support its war effort. However, there is little evidence that the Kremlin is actively pushing for a large-scale deployment of Belarusian troops to the front.

Both Putin and Lukashenka understand the risks. The Belarusian military lacks recent combat experience and is not configured for sustained offensive operations in Ukraine. More importantly, Belarusian public support for direct participation in the war remains low. Significant combat losses could create domestic tensions inside Belarus.

For that reason, the arrangement that has existed since 2022—Belarus providing territory, logistics, training grounds, and strategic support while avoiding direct combat involvement—has served the interests of both Moscow and Lukashenka. Putin gains access to Belarus without assuming the political costs of Belarusian casualties, while Lukashenka avoids a potentially dangerous domestic backlash.

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TNM: You mentioned the Union State earlier. On the political level, this institution has helped create inextricable military and economic ties between Russia and Belarus. However, that doesn’t reflect how the Belarusian population views this partnership. How has popular Belarusian sentiment toward Russia changed since the start of the Ukraine war?

HL: I will refer both to research and to what I hear from people on the ground. There is also solid public data—for example, Chatham House research—that is widely available and easy to check. What that research consistently shows is that an overwhelming majority of Belarusians do not want their country involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine. One widely cited figure is that around 97% of Belarusians oppose participation. And this is not just the opposition or politically active groups—it also includes people who support Lukashenka or work within the state system. In that sense, this really is not “their war.”

For some Russians, their country is fighting and they may feel patriotic. For people inside Belarus, that’s certainly not the case. That doesn’t mean everyone fully rejects Russia’s narrative—propaganda does have an effect, and some people don’t connect all the dots. But they are a minority.

Despite years of propaganda—especially since 2022, but even since the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas war—that did not change the mentality of Belarusians. They don’t want to go and fight for Russia. We can certainly say that there is a clear understanding that Belarus is and should remain an independent country. Only a very small minority, usually a few percent depending on a survey, would say they would fully support joining Russia.

Where it gets more complicated is what people want instead. A lot of Belarusians will say something like: “We just want to have good relations with everyone.” With Russia, with the EU—ideally both. Of course, in reality that’s not really possible in today’s geopolitical situation, but it reflects something important: a desire to avoid confrontation, isolation, and war.

There is also a kind of realism in how people think about the West. Even if Belarus changed tomorrow, most people understand that EU membership is not something that would happen quickly. So expectations are shaped more by caution than by big political visions.

One more thing you notice in everyday life is how interactions with Russians in Belarus have changed. There are more Russian visitors now, and while Belarusians are generally open and welcoming, it sometimes creates tension in small, everyday ways—around language, behavior, even things like currency or assumptions about the country. For some people, it reinforces the feeling that “we are not the same.” Belarusians increasingly see themselves as separate from Russia. And despite years and decades of propaganda, the core position is consistent: they do not want to be part of this war, and they want Belarus to remain independent.

TNM: There have been recent reports of thousands of Russian troops closing in on or stationed in Belarus. To what extent does this pose the threat of a Russian invasion?

HL: There are Russian troops in Belarus—at least around 2,000, based on current assessments. Could Russia try to occupy Belarus? In theory, yes. But what would that achieve?

Occupying a country that does not want to be part of Russia would be extremely difficult. Russia has not succeeded in doing that in Ukraine. It annexed Crimea, but it has never managed to occupy an entire sovereign country. I do not see how it could do so in Belarus.

Belarus is not a divided country. There is no significant constituency arguing that Belarus should join Russia. Most Belarusians speak Russian, but they also want Belarus to remain an independent state. That distinction is important.

More importantly, Putin does not need to occupy Belarus. He already has a loyal partner in Lukashenka, who maintains control over the country. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Belarus already serves many of Russia’s strategic purposes. It functions as a military staging ground from which Russian forces can threaten or attack Ukraine. It has also been used to help destabilize neighboring EU and NATO countries, whether through the manufactured migration crisis or other forms of hybrid pressure, including incidents involving Lithuanian airspace.

An outright occupation would likely provoke resistance inside Belarus. I am not necessarily referring to military resistance—the Belarusian Army has limited combat-ready capabilities—but other forms of resistance would almost certainly emerge. I do not believe Belarusians would accept such a move quietly. That is why I do not see a Russian occupation as the most likely scenario.

That said, there are deeply concerning developments that should not be overlooked. One is the announced deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. This increases Belarus’s vulnerability by making it a potential target in the event of a broader conflict involving NATO or Ukraine.

It also raises a longer-term sovereignty issue. If Russia establishes a permanent nuclear presence in Belarus, removing it would be extraordinarily difficult, even if Belarus were to become democratic and fully independent in the future.

Another example is the planned deployment of Oreshnik missiles in Belarus. These developments demonstrate that Russia does not need to formally occupy Belarus in order to erode its sovereignty. Military integration, dependence in foreign policy, economic ties, and security cooperation already give Moscow substantial influence over the country.

In other words, the greatest threat to Belarusian sovereignty is not necessarily a Russian invasion. It is the gradual expansion of Russian control without the need for formal occupation.

TNM: How can the international community support the pro-democracy movement in Belarus?

HL: Belarus remains under severe repression. Hundreds of political prisoners are still behind bars, independent media have been forced into exile, and civil society organizations have been dismantled inside the country.

At the same time, democratic forces have not disappeared. Independent media continue to reach millions of Belarusians every month, civil society remains active despite enormous pressure, and many Belarusians continue to support democratic change. The democratic movement survives, even under some of the harshest conditions in Europe.

I would highlight three priorities of what can be done to help Belarusians.

First, maintain pressure on the regime. The Belarusian authorities respond to pressure, not goodwill gestures. We can see this today in the ongoing releases of political prisoners, which have often been linked to international pressure and negotiations. Sanctions are not an end in themselves, but they remain an important tool. They should be used strategically and should not be lifted prematurely. While prisoner releases are welcome, repression continues. New arrests are taking place, and the number of newly recognized political prisoners remains comparable to the number of those being released through US mediation. We should keep this in mind.

Second, support independent media and civil society. These organizations continue to reach people inside Belarus and provide access to information that the regime tries to suppress. The demand for independent information remains strong. Yet many Belarusian media outlets and civil society groups are facing growing financial difficulties. The reduction of international assistance and shifting donor priorities have created serious challenges at a time when the need for support is greater than ever. Sustained funding is essential if these organizations are to continue their work.

Third, continue accountability efforts. There are ongoing initiatives to bring Lukashenka and other officials to justice for international crimes. These include investigations related to transnational repression, the forced displacement of people (the ICC launched an investigation), Belarus’s role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarusian territory. Democratic countries should continue supporting these efforts.

Accountability matters not only because justice is important, but because it sends a clear message that those responsible for serious abuses will eventually face consequences. If the international community remains focused on these three priorities—pressure, support for democratic institutions, and accountability—it can help contribute to Belarus’s democratic future.

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The Renew Democracy Initiative, publisher of The Next Move, is pleased to join the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism, publisher of The UnPopulist, as a media partner for the third annual Liberalism for the 21st Century Conference—LibCon 2026—in Washington, DC on July 16 and 17. Click here for more information and to register. Coinciding with America’s 250^th anniversary, the theme of the conference is the Reconstruction Agenda. The conference will assess the damage that authoritarian and demagogic politics have caused to the country’s liberal institutions and propose a path forward to rebuild accountability and confidence in the rule of law. The conference features a stellar lineup, including RDI Vice Chair Linda Chavez, along with Francis Fukuyama, Anne Applebaum, David French, Hong Kong dissident Nathan Law and many more. We’ll be there and so should you.

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Garry Kasparov is the chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move.

This past Saturday, June 27, I was invited to deliver remarks at the Dubrovnik Forum, a conference on international politics, security, and strategy. I opened a session on modern warfare, the defense industry, and Europe’s strategic choices. In attendance were officials from the governments of many NATO members and other democratic allies.

Here is what I told them:

Thank you. I would like to thank Prime Minister Plenkovic, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and the other organizers of the Dubrovnik Forum.

I have lived in New York ever since I was forced to leave Russia in 2013, facing imminent arrest. However, I am here as a proud citizen of the Republic of Croatia. We have more than an EU passport in common—we share democratic European values. And because of that, I will always speak of Europe in terms of “we” and “us.”

Standing here, in Croatia, a NATO member, I take no satisfaction from stating: NATO is effectively dead.

I already got in trouble for saying “NATO is dead” at the Halifax Security Forum last year. It doesn’t faze me. But I can see some faces beginning to turn, so allow me to explain what I mean.

NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—as it was originally conceived is irrelevant.

In 1949, the alliance was established as a bloc of democratic European nations under American protection with one purpose and to fight one war. Not a war in Afghanistan or Libya. This alliance was meant to fight a war to defend the continent from a Russian attack.

Well, Russia has begun its westward aggression. In 2014—expanding that attack in 2022.

Where are the Americans, the supposed guarantors of European security?

Under the Obama administration, they did nothing—actually, worse than nothing, by continuing negotiations with Russia on climate change, the Iran nuclear program, and the Middle East, while largely ignoring Putin’s blatant violation of the international order on European soil. Under the Biden administration, they dragged their feet, providing assistance to Ukraine too little, too late. They lectured Kyiv about “escalation” as Russia dragged Ukraine into an ever more gruesome war.

Now, under the Trump administration, the United States is hostile—arguably an active collaborator with Moscow.

Where are we, the Europeans? We have allowed our muscles to atrophy. The European institutions that lifted the continent out of the ashes of World War II—and enabled a nation like Croatia to prosper after the turmoil of the 1990s—these institutions were built without a serious military component.

Security? The Americans will take care of that! This was always the assumption.

It was only last year that the European Commission finally established a Directorate-General for Defense Industry and Space.

For decades, we prospered—but even as we prospered, our safety was an illusion, paid for by American largesse.

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Now, we see that an alliance designed for collective security is functioning like a protection racket. This is the natural consequence of outsourcing our safety to Washington. We were blind to the isolationist mood rising at both ends of the American political spectrum.

So far, I have only given you bad news. But there is a silver lining, won through the sacrifice of thousands upon thousands of brave Ukrainians. Europe is indeed behind—militarily and technologically.

But Europe has a robust economy and manpower. Europe’s backwardness is the result of a political choice. We can catch up, with Ukraine as the cornerstone of a new European security architecture.

Ukraine is not only defying so-called “expert analysis,” fighting on into the fifth year of a Putin-planned three-day war—a three-day timeline, incidentally, shared by most Western governments. Ukraine is the only nation in Europe that is really preparing for the day after America withdraws. Ukraine is proactively building the post-American security order on the battlefield today. What they are doing is revolutionary.

Ukraine knocks out $50,000 Iranian Shaheds with improvised drones that cost a fraction of that price—far less expensive than American Patriots or even Israeli Iron Dome interceptors. Ukraine is ahead of many nations in integrating artificial intelligence into the battlefield. Ukraine will soon fly Swedish fighter jets in its air force rather than rely entirely upon American models. My country, Croatia, recently made a similar decision, purchasing French Rafales instead of American planes. Ukraine strikes back deep into Russia whether or not the worryworts in Washington give their blessing.

It is a tragedy that Ukrainians have paid a deadly price in order to reverse Europe’s technological and military decline. You can honor their sacrifice by supporting them—and following their example by pulling your weight abroad and innovating at home. It will ultimately be to the benefit of us all: advances in medical and consumer technologies are often downstream of developments in battlefield science.

Consider what Ukraine has accomplished despite the obstacles: Ukrainians only broke free of the Russian-Soviet Empire again in 1991, and their sovereignty has been under brutal attack for a third of its modern independent existence. Europe is wanting for willpower, not resources.

This is the challenge facing Europe and all countries that once counted on the United States for support.

I am joined at this forum by ministers from many such democratic allies: Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Lithuania, Albania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Portugal, Kosovo, Hungary, North Macedonia… forgive me if I have missed any.

You will return to your capitals and debate the particulars of your foreign and defense policies.

But let these principles be your north star: a commitment to real European collective defense and homegrown technological excellence, the boldness to finally cut the umbilical cord with America, a serious recognition of the fact that Putin’s regime is devoted to perpetual war, and the self-respect to actually stand up and fight for our democratic way of life.

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The Renew Democracy Initiative, publisher of The Next Move, is pleased to join the Institute for the Study of Modern Authoritarianism, publisher of The UnPopulist, as a media partner for the third annual Liberalism for the 21st Century Conference—LibCon 2026—in Washington, DC on July 16 and 17. Click here for more information and to register. Coinciding with America’s 250^th anniversary, the theme of the conference is the Reconstruction Agenda. The conference will assess the damage that authoritarian and demagogic politics have caused to the country’s liberal institutions and propose a path forward to rebuild accountability and confidence in the rule of law. The conference features a stellar lineup, including RDI Vice Chair Linda Chavez, along with Francis Fukuyama, Anne Applebaum, David French, Hong Kong dissident Nathan Law and many more. We’ll be there and so should you.

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Issac Luna (Olvera) is a former US Marine Corps officer who fought for the Ukrainian military after the full-scale Russian invasion. He is the author of the book Reckoning Dreams and Fire, a memoir about his experience in Ukraine and other battles. Mr. Luna remains based in Ukraine. Follow him on X.

The American embassy warned of an impending Russian attack against Kyiv, which could include ballistic missiles.

It was about midnight, Sunday, May 24, 2026. My fiancée and I had just finished watching a nature documentary—zebras grazing in the Serengeti, sloths dangling from trees in Costa Rica. We had committed to going to sleep.

Thirty-two minutes later, we heard the dreaded phone alarm that signals an air threat. Something menacing was airborne, coming from Russia or the occupied territories. Too soon to know where it was headed or where it would land.

At about 1:00 a.m., I found out. They were coming to us. The air defense went into full mode. First came the sound of piston engines buzzing overhead. Hundreds of interceptor drones launched to head off the incoming attack. Machine guns opened fire, in case the interceptors failed. Then came a massive blast—an American Patriot or a German IRIS-T (I can almost tell the difference by now).

The cacophony of twenty-first-century warfare filled the sky. My fiancée Mariia and I sat tense. We knew we would not sleep. She put on extra clothes. She fears being pulled from the rubble in too little clothing—a rational and practical fear many Ukrainians have quietly developed.

Then the ground vibrated. Not just the building foundation, but something deeper, almost tectonic. The Patriots missed and something powerful—very powerful—hit.

It was an Oreshnik. It is a terrifying weapon: a hypersonic ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It travels at Mach 10 and separates in the upper atmosphere to unleash six independent warheads, each containing smaller submunitions. It is almost impossible to stop.

For the four million people living under this aerial battle, there is only one primitive means of protection: go underground.

We do not have a shelter in our building, so we move away from the windows and place our faith in probabilities. I have worked out the math before. Suppose this is a major attack: one thousand aerial threats. Ninety percent get intercepted. One hundred get through. Assume each kills ten people—one thousand dead. Kyiv has roughly four million residents. That gives you a one-in-four-thousand chance. About 0.025 percent.

Many Ukrainians have done some version of this calculation, even if only subconsciously. For a former military officer, the helplessness is devastating. So we try to sleep through the onslaught.

At 10:00am, neither of us knew how much we had slept, if at all. Mariia and I looked at each other, unsure if it was all a nightmare. It was—a living nightmare that has now played out for more than 1,550 days.

When I checked the news, the scale of the damage was devastating. Six hundred Shahed drones, thirty-three ballistic missiles, and fifty-seven cruise missiles. Data gathered by The New York Times suggests this was the largest Russian attack—not just on Kyiv, but anywhere in Ukraine—since December 2024.

Learn more about the Renew Democracy Initiative’s work in Ukraine:

A popular market near us—normally packed with thousands of shoppers on a Sunday morning—was reduced to a heap of twisted steel and ash. Completely destroyed. The recently reopened Chernobyl Museum suffered a collapsed roof, and artifacts that had survived one disaster 40 years ago did not survive this one. One cruise missile, which ignites a booster rocket during its final descent to evade interception, crashed through the base of a high-rise building, carving a massive hole into the underground parking structure.

A water supply station, the Institute for Religious Studies, the Podil Opera Theatre, and the Kyiv School of Economics—all civilian sites—were damaged. More than one hundred people were wounded, but it was still too early to know how many will end up dead.

Living in a war zone for four years, I see both the worst of humanity, and the best of humanity, side by side. Air defense brigades—many composed of former college students, teachers, and retirees—intercepted 92% of drones and 60%of missiles. They validated my estimate of survivability. Rescue workers, poorly paid and fully aware that secondary strikes are possible, rummaged through rubble searching for survivors, including pets.

Yevhen, is a slim man in his early forties. He had sold his home to open a café in Kyiv. The café had opened for business the day before. Overnight, it was heavily damaged. But because some of his machines and coffee supplies survived, he reopened, handing out free coffee through shattered windows.

On the military front, Russia has failed to make meaningful progress.

During Russia’s attempt to take Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast, one Ukrainian website quipped: “The three-toed sloth sleeps eighteen hours a day, defecates once a week, and is still making better time than the [Russian[ 11th Army Corps.”

The sloth, according to the site, would have advanced 74 %faster and at a far lower cost. Over 35,000 Russian personnel were reportedly killed or severely wounded during April, the deadliest month on record, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.

In Moscow, where Putin had banked on public support and minimal disruption to daily life, residents can no longer dismiss the war as a distant “special military operation.” Drone attacks are increasingly common. Military-linked industrial facilities have been hit. Refineries and oil terminals far from the Ukrainian border have also reportedly been targeted. The road connecting Russia to Crimea along the Sea of Azov has increasingly become a highway of death, where Ukrainian drones strike military logistics almost at will.

Unable to produce a decisive victory on the battlefield, Putin has increasingly resorted to the one tactic he can always sell to his public as a victory: terrorism. Hence Sunday’s attack.

These attacks were enabled by a recent financial windfall. The war in Iran pushed oil prices upward, while Trump recently lifted sanctions on Russian oil, giving Putin a lifeline and replenishing the Russian treasury with at least a billion dollars a day.

The American government, through its embassy in Ukraine, warned of the attack. But it made no effort to use its considerable leverage over Russia to help prevent it, even though it could have.

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Garry Kasparov is the founder and chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move.

Last Thursday, I received the Friend of Ukraine Award at the Tryzub Awards Gala in Toronto. Here are my remarks from that evening:

Good evening.

To begin with, I’d like to thank our hosts, the Tryzub Gala Foundation, for their invitation, and for this prestigious award.

Dyakuyu.

Of course, the real heroes are the men and women of Ukraine, who are fighting every day and every night, not only for their nation, but for the entire Free World.

The war in Ukraine is like chess: it’s black and white. Anyone who can’t tell you who is good and who is evil there is willfully blind.

But unlike in chess, there can be no tie in this war. It is a contest of good versus evil, and you do not accommodate evil—even halfway.

This war demands moral clarity, not politically correct slogans cooked up by a committee. So let me say, loudly and clearly enough that they can hear me from across Lake Ontario:

Ukraine. Must. Win.

And there’s another part to it—something that even the most pro-Ukrainian politicians in Ottawa, Washington, and Brussels aren’t comfortable saying.

Russia. Must. Lose.

The Russian. Empire. Must. Fall.

Under the banner of the organization I founded in 2016, the Free Russia Forum, it is written: Victory for Ukraine, freedom for Russia. And it must happen in that order. Anyone who wants to seriously oppose Vladimir Putin must adopt that as their north star, and also declare, without stuttering: Crimea is Ukraine.

But this war is not just Putin’s war. It is Russia’s war. Nothing less than the Ukrainian flag flying over Sevastopol will extinguish the imperial virus that, for centuries, has plagued Russia and brought ruin to its neighbors.

So I will repeat: The Russian Empire must fall.

But saying all of this is the easy part. The more difficult challenge is one of strategy. Looking at the Russian invasion of Ukraine, you must survey the entire board, not just individual pieces.

The state of play is indeed complicated, especially from where we sit here in Toronto.

For decades, Canada’s strategy was based upon its status as—let us be blunt—a junior partner of the United States of America. You prospered under the protection of a benevolent giant to the south.

Well, as your prime minister noted in Davos just a few months ago, things are certainly different now.

The giant is not so benevolent anymore. The giant is orange in the face, prone to mood swings, and curiously aligned with the Russian way of thinking… and you’re starting to get flashbacks to 1812.

The answer to all of this is not to trade your role as a subordinate of one great power for another, swapping your arrangement with the US for, god forbid, China—one of Russia’s leading accomplices in its genocidal devastation of Ukraine.

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The responsibility you shoulder now is to lead—as an equal partner with your allies across the Atlantic, who are navigating a similar challenge too.

For inspiration, you must look to your kin in Ukraine.

There is actually an interesting parallel in the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and the US and Canada, on the other.

For centuries, Ukraine was chained to the Russian and Soviet empires. Because of this history of Kremlin colonialism, Ukraine shared many cultural, linguistic, political, and economic ties with Russia.

While Canada’s ties with the US weren’t forced upon you, you too share a common heritage with a larger neighbor, a natural choice guided by shared history and geography.

For centuries, Ukraine lived under Russia’s shadow, as you lived under America’s.

Yet, since 1991, Ukraine has proved that history and geography are not destiny. And since that fateful day in February 2022, Ukraine has been the spiritual leader of the Free World.

While Boris Yeltsin was shelling the Russian parliament and launching a genocidal war in Chechnya, Ukrainians held free elections and a peaceful transfer of power.

While Vladimir Putin was murdering political opponents, Ukrainians were doing the hard work of building democracy.

While Russia slid into the embrace of China and other authoritarian states, the Ukrainian people braved bullets and batons on the maidan and demanded their nation turn West.

And when Russia invaded Ukraine solely with the aim of destroying, Ukraine continued to build. Ukraine built a modern military powerhouse, raised the strongest army in Europe and became an innovator in drone warfare.

My organization, the Renew Democracy Initiative, has been delivering life-saving aid to Ukraine since day one of the full-scale invasion—$15 million worth in the last four years. Just this spring, RDI led our second delegation to Ukraine—going to the frontlines in Kharkiv.

My colleagues also saw firsthand how Ukraine is punching above its weight. They met with the commander of Ukraine’s most effective drone unit. If the president of the United States were actually a successful businessman, he might take note of the fact that Ukraine is inflicting eleven-figure damages on Russian targets using UAVs that cost just a few thousand dollars each.

The lesson Ukrainians have for all of you in this room is that global leadership is not reserved for empires. Your past… your geography… these are not excuses to abdicate your responsibility as a founding member of the democratic alliance.

If the people of Ukraine, just 35 years after the fall of the USSR, with missiles, and drones, and rockets raining down upon them, abandoned by the US administration, if the people of Ukraine can lead—then Europe must lead, and your gameplan must be for Canada to lead too.

It would have been nice if Canada and the world’s other democracies had time to grow into this leadership role, gradually, without having that role violently thrust upon them by buffoons like Donald Trump and JD Vance. But… how does the serenity prayer go? “Give me the grace to accept what I can’t change, and the courage to change what I can.”

Well, here we are. Time to muster that courage.

Slava Ukraini.

P.S. While I was in Toronto, I had the opportunity to meet Canadian-American journalist and past Tryzub awardee Diane Francis. She recently gave a great interview about where things stand between Moscow and Kyiv. I encourage you to give it a watch:

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Garry Kasparov is the founder and chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative, which publishes The Next Move.

Uriel Epshtein is the CEO of the Renew Democracy Initiative.

Things aren’t looking great for Vladimir Putin. The war in Ukraine isn’t going well. He’s afraid of coups and drone strikes. It’s not even safe for his personal chefs and photographers to ride the Moscow Metro.

The Russian dictator is apparently confining himself for extended periods in various bunkers.

This is all according to a leaked European intelligence dossier whose contents were reported by CNN and other outlets earlier today.

It’s not exactly the news that anyone, least of all Putin, expected to read when Russia launched its “three-day special military operation”!

(You might be asking: Were the Russians seriously expecting Ukraine to just absorb a genocidal war? And the answer is apparently, yes—that’s what happens when a dictator surrounds himself with sycophants who only tell him what he wants to hear.)

Is Putin actually sheltering in the führerbunker? Eh. Who can say?

Instead of debating rumors and leaks, let’s focus on what we know for certain:

First, the Ukrainian military has the capacity to threaten the Russian aggressors on Russian soil.

In one operation, Ukrainian drones shut down all four of Moscow’s international airports.

A few days ago, another drone struck a swanky Moscow neighborhood home to Kremlin elites.

And in recent months, unmanned aerial vehicles have been inflicting punishing strikes on oil facilities in Russia. These Ukrainian operations are the only thing preventing the Kremlin from taking full advantage of the spike in oil prices amid Donald Trump’s war in Iran. These refineries are also facilities owned by Russian businessmen who are not happy that Putin put their assets in the line of fire.

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Uriel has witnessed Ukraine’s impressive UAV capabilities firsthand. Just six weeks back, our organization, the Renew Democracy Initiative, led a delegation to Ukraine, where the group met with the deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, an entrepreneur who built the country’s most effective drone unit while working out of a garage.

Some of the UAVs in Kyiv’s arsenal cost as little as $1,000 to produce, while dishing out billions in damage to Russian infrastructure—and yielding the most priceless victory of all, shattering Russians’ sense of imperial invincibility.

Victory Day—the regime’s most flamboyant display of martial prowess—is just 96 hours away. Back in the USSR, a seemingly endless cascade of Red Army soldiers, armor, and artillery would stream past the Kremlin walls every May 9. Since coming to power nearly three decades ago, Putin has made the parade a centerpiece of a propaganda campaign that leans hard on Soviet nostalgia.

Last year, Russia had to rein in the festivities due to Ukraine’s success in penetrating the Russian capital’s defenses. This year, the tanks and the missiles will be conspicuously absent—no need to roll high-profile military targets out into the open. Indeed, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he won’t rule out hitting Red Square.

A responsible leader would probably cancel the event altogether. Putin won’t—doing so would mean conceding military defeat. He knows that when Russia loses a war, the regime comes down too: remember 1905, 1917, and 1989.

So Putin is stuck: He can’t win the war. He can’t end the war. In the meantime, the grumbling among Russia’s once-loyal military bloggers will only grow louder. Things that would once earn a long prison sentence are now said on Russian social media with increasing candor.

Here’s another thing we can say with confidence: The excuses for not supporting Ukraine don’t hold up.

In last year’s infamous Oval Office showdown, Donald Trump told Zelenskyy that the Ukrainians “don’t have the cards.” That’s clearly been disproven through Ukraine’s ability to reach deep into the heart of the Russian Federation (and the fact that it is the Trump administration that now turns to Kyiv for help with fighting Iran).

It looks like Ukraine still has some cards to play after all.

As Ukraine presses the advantage, the excuses will change. We’ll hear more of the tired slander that Ukraine doesn’t want peace. To the contrary, peace remains very much possible. But peace will only come when Ukraine wins, Russia loses, and Putin falls.

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A note from Garry Kasparov: Celebrate one year of The Next Move and save 30% when you upgrade to join our premium subscriber community and get invitations to exclusive Zoom conversations, early access to podcasts, and other benefits! Upgrade now and don’t miss our next premium subscriber-exclusive call where I’ll be joined by former White House attorney Ty Cobb and RDI CEO Uriel Epshtein—coming up on Thursday, April 30 at 5pm ET/2pm PT. Click here to register.

Issac Luna (Olvera) is a former US Marine Corps officer who fought for the Ukrainian military after the full-scale Russian invasion. He is the author of the book Reckoning Dreams and Fire, a memoir about his experience in Ukraine and other battles. Mr. Luna remains based in Ukraine. Follow him on X.

It was around this time in the spring of 2022 when the Russian army retreated in defeat from the outskirts of Kyiv.

Media outlets around the world rejoiced: “Irpin, Bucha, liberated.” I was there, as a volunteer in the Ukrainian army, but around me, no one celebrated. We suspected Putin’s troops might regroup and counterattack.

At the start of that year, I had been a business consultant in Houston, Texas. When Russia invaded Ukraine, I was outraged and wanted to help. Having been an officer in the US Marines, I thought my skills could be useful on the ground. So, on day four of the invasion, I quit my job and came to fight in Ukraine. I thought I might contribute as a planner or advisor, given my background. Instead, I joined as an ordinary rifleman—and sometimes as a rocket man—with no rank, no pay, and lots of unknowns.

On my first mission, we occupied an empty residential tower across from the State Tax University, an elegant century-old building, in Irpin, a suburb of Kyiv. The street between us and the university was the battle line. Ukrainian forces controlled the south sides; the north was under Russian occupation—part of Irpin, and another suburb called Bucha. From our tower, we looked for Russian positions and called in artillery strikes.

On March 28, the Russians retreated from Irpin but remained in Bucha. We pushed forward to the edge of Irpin, into positions that Russians had just abandoned. Apartments had been looted—drawers emptied, closets overturned.

In the nearby forest, we found dead civilians, killed by artillery—six of them, some still wearing pajamas. We buried them. By then, Russians were also retreating from Bucha. On their way out, they indiscriminately fired more artillery. One barrage battered our position. We evacuated when the roof caught fire and collapsed. After a few days, I accepted that the Russians were not coming back, but the sense of victory was short-lived.

At the start of the occupation, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, an elite Russian unit, established a headquarters at 144 Yablunska (Apple) Street, a kilometer behind the university.

After the Russian withdrawal, journalists and investigators entered the area. What had been a quiet, affluent suburb was now a crime scene. CCTV footage from a home on Apple Street showed Russian soldiers leading civilians at gunpoint toward the headquarters compound. It was the last time most of them were seen alive. Investigators found bodies scattered in the street. Others were found in basements with their hands bound, bearing signs of torture prior to execution. Many women reported being raped in homes that Russians had converted into barracks. These were not cases of collateral damage or victims of chaos; they were proof of a systematic terror campaign.

Volunteers, state investigators, victims, and witnesses identified many of the soldiers responsible for these crimes. They were members of units working under the command of the 76th Air Assault Division or adjacent to it. The most prominent units involved were the 234th and 237th Air Assault Regiments, the 64th Motor Rifle Brigade, and the 155th Marine Brigade. It has been four years since the massacres. Where are the perpetrators?

After their defeat outside Kyiv, those Russian units relocated to other parts of Ukraine, where they deployed the same vicious tactics. Yet while they escaped Bucha, they did not evade justice altogether—not all of them.

Igor Zharov and Aleksey Afonin, both lieutenant colonels in the 234th Regiment, were killed sometime in 2022, according to obituaries. Their commander, Colonel Artyom Gorodilov, is in prison, though not for the right reasons. In 2024, he was arrested in Russia—not for war crimes, but for corruption.

One particularly memorable update came through in July of last year. Mikhail Gudkov was a Russian officer at the center of events on Apple Street.

As a colonel, Gudkov commanded Russia’s 155th Marine Brigade in the Kyiv suburbs. He had advanced far and fast in his military career since then. By 2025, he was a major general and deputy commander of the entire Russian Navy. In July 2025, Ukrainian forces struck a headquarters inside the Kursk region of Russia. Gudkov, along with other senior officers, was killed.

For those of us who were there in Bucha and Irpin, there is no moral ambiguity in this outcome. His death, and those of his soldiers, was not a tragedy, but a consequence. We saw what was left behind. We walked through homes that had been stripped bare. We found civilians in the forest. We learned what happened on Apple Street. And then we watched the same units show up somewhere else and do it again. Whether a man like Gudkov personally ordered a specific execution or not does not change the fact that he was part of a criminal enterprise that perpetrated it. So, when news comes that one of those commanders is dead, my reaction is not complicated—it’s satisfaction, even glee.

Yet the death of Russian war criminals is also not closure. Nothing can provide that. Nothing can undo what happened. But it is at least imperfect justice.

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In February 2023, Ukrainian troops captured a group of 17 soldiers in Luhansk province in Donbas. Among them was Nikolai Kartashev. He was not a high-ranking officer, but an ordinary soldier tied to the 234th during the occupation of Bucha. He confessed to killing civilians under orders as well as witnessing torture and the rape of a woman in a cellar. He identified co-perpetrators and commanders, yet he expressed no remorse and said he wanted to return to war. He is still in prison.

It is safe to say that many, maybe most, of the foot soldiers who perpetrated these crimes are dead. Many literally disappeared. They ended up blown apart, their remains shredded, unidentified and untraceable in the field or a morgue. Both the 155th Marine Brigade and the 237th Air Assault Regiment were destroyed in the subsequent months of the war.

In 2023, the 155th Brigade fought in the battle of Vuhledar, an absolute meat grinder. Columns of the 155th drove into minefields and kill zones. Dozens of vehicles were hit, and when the survivors bunched up, they were finished by Ukrainian artillery. More than 130 armored vehicles were destroyed in a single week, including 36 tanks. During the worst of it, between 150–300 marines reportedly died daily. The entire brigade was wiped out. Then it reconstituted and was destroyed again. And then again. This cycle of annihilation was repeated as many as eight times.

The 237th Assault Regiment left Bucha severely degraded, then relocated and experienced the same cycle as the 155th: it relocated, took staggering losses, reformed, and was destroyed again. By mid to late 2022, six months after Bucha, open-source analysts reported that the 237th effectively no longer existed. An entire criminal organization, wiped out.

The individual acts of Russian soldiers—executions, torture, rape—add to the list of charges, but they are not required to establish guilt. The war itself is a crime, beginning with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Everything that followed—Bucha, Irpin, Mariupol, Kherson—flows from that decision. Everyone who crossed that border as part of the invasion is guilty, as are those who commanded it—especially Putin. They are all criminals. In the countries where most people are reading this, accountability would come through courts. In this war, Ukrainians have no hope of such an outcome, and they do not wait for it. Russia will never persecute its war criminals, for Russian leaders are such criminals. Thus, for the criminals of Bucha, justice comes not by gavel, but by gun.

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Editor’s Note: The Renew Democracy Initiative—publisher of The Next Move—is in Ukraine! We’ll be sharing daily dispatches from our delegation. Premium subscribers will receive each Ukraine Dispatch 24 hours before anyone else. Be the first to get on-the-ground news from the frontlines of freedom by upgrading to join our premium subscriber community today! All proceeds go to support the work of the Renew Democracy Initiative, including humanitarian assistance to communities in Ukraine.

I got into an argument with a congressman last week (this is normal for me these days).

The representative in question is Don Bacon, a Republican serving Nebraska’s second district in the House. He’ll be retiring after the midterms.

Bacon is a rarity in the modern GOP—a sincere supporter of Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. He’s also one of the few who seems to actually want to carry on the example set by President Ronald Reagan.

Yet sincerity is no substitute for action, and this is where he and I came to blows.

It’s clear that Trump is working hand in glove with Vladimir Putin against Ukraine. A Russian delegation is in Washington, hosted by several of Bacon’s fellow Republicans (and, it seems, one Democrat).

The administration recently lifted sanctions on Russian oil.

The White House is teasing an invite to the Kremlin’s Belarusian puppet, Alexander Lukashenko—also newly freed from sanctions.

Pete Hegseth’s Defense Department is about to divert $750 million in funds paid out by NATO allies for life-saving military aid away from Ukraine. This is just shameless theft.

The president continues to insult Ukraine and its leaders—conditioning aid upon the surrender of territory to the Russian aggressor. He does all of this while Kyiv sends drone experts to rescue US troops in the Middle East. Think about it: to show just how much goodwill they have for the American people and save American lives, the Ukrainians are sacrificing resources that could be put toward their existential fight with Russia.

And Donald Trump spits on them.

I believe the Nebraska congressman is being genuine in his statements of support for Kyiv. Bacon has criticized President Trump before, which sets him apart from sycophants like Senator Lindsay Graham.

That is why I insisted to Bacon (who’d just posted an inspiring Churchill quote) on more action, less tweeting. Bacon muted me in response.

(To those inclined to call me a hypocrite for admonishing someone for tweeting with a tweet of my own—I am not a congressman, but I’m doing what I can—have a look at what my organization, the Renew Democracy Initiative, is doing to provide material support for Ukraine.)

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Representative Bacon doesn’t realize the power that he holds. Republicans hold a razor-thin majority in the House. If Bacon plays hardball for Ukraine, he’d could put Mike Johnson’s speakership on the line with just two more defections (perhaps Michael McCaul of Texas, another pro-Ukraine diamond in the Russia-supporting rough, and Kevin Kiley, a Republican-recently-turned-independent).

That leaves the Nebraska congressman in a strong negotiating position to demand the administration change course on Ukraine. With no election to worry about, Bacon is free from many of the typical political constraints.

I recognize that opening the door to a Hakeem Jeffries speakership is a difficult pill to swallow for a principled conservative like Bacon. I have my issues with today’s Democrats, and while I’m not an American, many of my political heroes come from the Republican old guard.

Yet Ukraine’s cause demands more from those of us in the US. If young Ukrainian men and women can sacrifice their lives to defend the Free World, can’t an outgoing congressman sacrifice his partisan loyalty to defend Ukraine?

Congressman Bacon, I know you are a good guy. The problem is that simply being a good guy is not enough. You have the power and influence to act on your words.

If you can do that, I’ll forgive you for keeping me muted on Twitter. I do post a lot.

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Editor’s Note: The Renew Democracy Initiative—publisher of The Next Move—is headed to Ukraine! Starting on Monday, we’ll be sharing daily dispatches from our delegation to Ukraine. The first installment will be immediately available to all readers—after that, each Ukraine dispatch will be exclusive to premium subscribers for the first 24 hours. Be the first to get on-the-ground news from the frontlines of freedom by upgrading to join our premium subscriber community today! All proceeds go to support the work of the Renew Democracy Initiative, including humanitarian assistance to communities in Ukraine.

Evan Gottesman is the director of communications and special projects at the Renew Democracy Initiative and managing editor of The Next Move.

There’s virtue in a short book that makes a compelling point.

One such book I recently happened upon is If Russia Wins: A Scenario, by Carlo Masala. At just 120 pages, I was able to read it on a short flight down from New York to DC’s National Airport.

This is not an exhaustive history of the war in Ukraine. It is, per the subtitle, a scenario, and an alarming one at that, sketching out the contours of another Russian invasion in Europe after the West abandons Ukraine.

Published in Germany last year, the English translation hit shelves in January, just days after another unusually friendly phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.

The point of divergence in If Russia Wins is a hypothetical peace agreement leaving Moscow in control of the roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory it holds today. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is pushed into the arrangement by an unnamed American president who says, “I don’t do bad deals.”

The Geneva Treaty, as Masala dubs it, is his first warning to the reader: Even if Moscow does not physically conquer all of Ukraine, legitimizing any of its gains would be a Russian victory

With the democratic West done with the war, a rump Ukraine plunges into chaos while the Russians rebuild their military capabilities and political capital. Russia, of course, is not done with deadly imperial nostalgia, just as it wasn’t done after its wars in Moldova, Georgia, and Syria, nor following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

The next target is Narva, Estonia. Officially a city, but more of a town, it is home to just 54,000 people, almost all of whom are Russian speakers. A third are actually citizens of the Russian Federation. The expansive Ivangorod Fortress in Russia looms across the Narva River like a slightly-too-on-the-nose metaphor for Estonia’s past.

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Masala has Russian soldiers crossing over to the west bank of the Narva and seizing the Estonian town.

Could it happen?

Estonia has been a NATO member since 2004. The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, are the only former Soviet republics to be admitted into the alliance (the Baltics’ annexation to the USSR under the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact was never recognized in Washington).

As a NATO member, Estonia is theoretically entitled to protection from its friends under the North Atlantic Treaty’s vaunted Article 5, which famously decrees that the allies “agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”

(Notably, Article 5 doesn’t explicitly require NATO members to go to war to defend a besieged ally—only for each government to undertake “such action as it deems necessary.”)

The North Atlantic Treaty was drawn up with the Soviet Union in mind, and it has never really been tested. Article 5 was only invoked once, at the behest of the United States, in an asymmetrical war against the terrorists responsible for the September 11 attacks.

Despite this, a 2024 Quincy Institute brief confidently asserts that:

A variety of factors, including NATO air and naval dominance, the difficulty of conquering urban areas, NATO political commitments to its eastern border states, and Russian weaknesses revealed in the Ukraine conflict, mean that Russian aggression against even NATO’s weakest states would carry enormous risks and be unlikely to succeed.

Carlo Masala is not the first person to argue that Estonia—and Narva, specifically—could be in the Kremlin’s crosshairs. What makes Masala’s analysis stand out from the usual Beltway fare is that he goes after sacred cows like NATO.

Would Americans really join their European allies in a fight with nuclear-armed Russia over tiny Estonia?

Of course! many DC pundits and Western officials would answer. We have “political commitments”! “Air and naval dominance”!

Probably not, Carlo Masala counters, soberingly, and—at least as of now—more accurately. Western resolve would certainly be shaky if Russia “only” invaded Narva—a town the size of New Brunswick, New Jersey—just as the West stumbled when Russia “only” annexed Crimea.

The author is an instructor at the Bundeswehr University Munich, an institution primarily catering to future officers in the German military. At their closest points, Germany and Ukraine are about 370 miles apart, not much longer than the distance I covered reading Masala’s book flying from New York to our nation’s capital. If anyone can bring home the urgency of the war in Ukraine, it is a European for whom the war is local.

Yet what’s absent from If Russia Wins is a clearly stated argument as to why Americans and their Western European allies should care about Narva. The question of the Estonian border town’s relevance hangs over every page of Masala’s scenario like the old French pro-appeasement slogan, “Why die for Danzig?”—a reference to another Baltic flashpoint.

The answer—which largely goes unstated in If Russia Wins—is that compromise only makes expansionist dictators hungry for more.

Yet every act of accommodation presents a tantalizing reprieve. More than one American president has attempted a “reset” with Russia, and every one has gotten played. The result is not just changing lines on a map, but lives destroyed under authoritarian rule (last year, we published Ukrainian journalist Olya Bilan’s personal account of survival during the Russian occupation of Bucha—a different kind of warning from Masala’s geopolitical assessment).

The open-ended nature of Carlo Masala’s scenario is not necessarily a weakness in his argument, but a challenge to the reader: Georgia mattered because of Ukraine. Ukraine mattered because of Narva. And we certainly know why Danzig mattered. Do you want to find out, on your own soil, why Narva matters too?

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A note from Garry Kasparov: In a world of oligarch-owned outlets, it’s more important than ever to support mission-driven media. You can take a stand by joining our premium subscriber community. Your support helps drive the work of the Renew Democracy Initiative, including delivering life-saving humanitarian aid for Ukraine (I don’t receive one kopek from your contributions!). Read on to the end of this article for an update on RDI’s activities on the frontlines in Ukraine.

All eyes are on Iran, but my Soviet upbringing has my heart first and foremost in Ukraine. While the casual observer might see the wars in Ukraine and Iran as being totally separate, they are actually more deeply connected than one might think.

I’ve shared the analysis that follows with friends on Capitol Hill, and hope you’ll benefit from it as well.

The Ukraine and Iran conflicts are close in a strictly geographic sense. The northwesternmost point in Iran is just 550 miles from the occupied Crimea—a shorter distance than most of Ukraine is from the city of Moscow, as the drone flies.

More importantly, Iran and Russia are authoritarian accomplices.

Iran outfitted the Russian military with Shahed attack drones and provided specialists to train Kremlin forces to murder Ukrainians with them. Russian forces have fired 57,000 Iranian drones at Ukraine since the full-scale invasion began. Ukraine, ever the resilient and innovative nation, has become a hub of expertise in drone interception.

The US could have tapped Ukraine for insight on how to stop Iranian UAVs before it took on the Islamic Republic. Washington could have provided Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles for the purpose of destroying the Alabuga drone factory in southern Russia, where localized production of Shaheds is taking place. America declined.

Because the Trump administration is openly hostile to Kyiv, it missed these opportunities and left American troops, bases, and allies exposed to pilotless attacks from Iran.

It’s not too late to change course. Given the Islamic Republic’s support for Putin, the Ukrainians are eager for the Iranian regime to take a hit (among world leaders, few seemed happier than Volodymyr Zelenskyy to see Ali Khamenei “pay for [his] crimes;” Democrats who are typically keen to support Zelenskyy should listen to him here).

On Thursday, the Ukrainian leader announced that he’d complied with an American request for help dealing with Shaheds (will JD Vance say “thank you”?). The US and the Gulf Arab states are now reportedly looking to buy Ukrainian interceptor drones to combat the Shahed threat. To think, the most powerful country on Earth and the wealthy oil kingdoms are turning to Ukraine for their defense. Imagine the kind of collaboration that would be possible if the US and its allies threw their full weight behind Kyiv.

ICYMI: Tune in to the latest episode of the Older/Wiser podcast:

Back to the Moscow-Tehran partnership. It isn’t just a matter of Iran sending drones to Russia. The deadly Russia-Iran trade is a two-way street. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has emerged as the Islamic Republic’s top arms supplier. The Kremlin has managed to keep up the flow even as its forces are ground down along the line of contact in Ukraine.

The fact that Moscow is still able to supply Iran with weapons after four years of war in Ukraine is a monumental policy failure on the part of the United States and its European allies. If the Ukrainians had received everything necessary to deal more decisive blows to the invaders, Russia might not have had the resources to help its fascist friends in Tehran.

Russia has improved upon the Shahed’s design after using it to lethal effect in Ukraine. While President Trump was busy feting Putin with handshakes, phone calls, and flyovers, Iran acquired new Russian attack helicopters, armored vehicles, rifles, jets, and critical spare parts for air defenses and planes. Fresh deliveries of Su-35 fighters are slated to begin this year. Those weapons are already being turned against Americans in uniform and civilians in neighboring countries who are forced to weather the death throes of the ayatollahs’ regime.

There is a lot of talk about a new war in the Middle East depleting stocks of American weapons that could have gone to Ukraine. Yet the United States still has plenty of Cold War-era equipment collecting dust in the California desert. Those weapons aren’t exactly state of the art, but they would offer a welcome boost to Ukraine’s fight. Currently, American taxpayers are footing the bill for the storage of tanks and other systems. Well, there’s no time like wartime to go for cost optimization.

The US-Israel attack on the Iranian regime is an opportunity to turn the tide against a global authoritarian network centered on Moscow. However, that objective cannot be accomplished piecemeal.

I am not holding my breath for Donald Trump’s fundamental attitude toward Kyiv to change. But this is no longer just a question of attitudes. The United States’ failings on Ukraine have now cost American lives in the Middle East. Perhaps those brave US servicemembers’ sacrifice can finally put sufficient pressure on the administration to give Ukraine what it needs to win.

An update on the Renew Democracy Initiative’s work in Ukraine

Now, something a little more positive!

Since 2022, the Renew Democracy Initiative (publisher of The Next Move) has delivered roughly $15 million in humanitarian aid to frontline communities in Ukraine. That includes bulletproof vests, food, medical supplies, and sleeping bags, among other essentials. It won’t win the war by itself, but it keeps people warm, well-fed, and, most importantly, alive.

We recently ordered 70,000 meals ready-to-eats (MREs, an acronym familiar to anyone who’s spent time around the military), mostly for the Kharkiv region. Kharkiv is located on the Russian border and is the target of relentless bombardment. The first tranche—21,504 MREs to be precise—were delivered this past week. Roughly half will go to civilians, and another half for the Ukrainian soldiers bravely defending their homeland.

On top of that, the Renew Democracy Initiative recently secured 31,000 warm meals for the capital city of Kyiv, where residents are enduring freezing nights and blackouts. We hope our Ukrainian friends like soup!

You can support RDI’s work by upgrading to join our premium subscriber community. RDI CEO Uriel Epshtein will also be leading a delegation to visit our partners on the ground in Ukraine later this month, so stay tuned for firsthand updates from the front here at The Next Move!

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A note from Garry Kasparov: Perhaps you recently canceled a subscription to an oligarch-owned newspaper. Might I humbly suggest that you put that money toward supporting mission-driven media like The Next Move? I don’t receive a cent from your subscription fees—everything goes to supporting the work of The Next Move’s parent organization, the Renew Democracy Initiative. RDI is bringing political dissidents to tell their stories to students, business leaders, and public officials. Delivering life-saving humanitarian aid to frontline communities in Ukraine. And, of course, driving the conversation here on Substack. To help make the decision easier, we’re offering 30% off an annual subscription, now through March 4.

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Ariane de Gennaro is a communications intern at the Renew Democracy Initiative and an incoming JD candidate at Harvard Law School. She previously wrote for the Yale Daily News and worked in the office of Senator Mazie Hirono.

Today marks four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In that time, thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, children abducted, cities destroyed, and critical energy infrastructure decimated. 2025 has been a particularly bloody year, with mounting casualties and, under President Trump’s second term, flagging American will and a renewed push to accommodate Vladimir Putin.

From the very first day of the full-scale invasion, the Renew Democracy Initiative—publisher of The Next Move—has worked to help our friends on the frontlines of freedom, rallying support in the United States, sharing Ukrainians’ stories, and delivering millions of dollars of humanitarian assistance to communities in Ukraine.

We’d like to take this moment to highlight some of our most important commentary and work on Ukraine. Yet as we reflect on the past, let’s remember: the war is not over— Ukraine still needs sustained and resolute support in order to win.

RDI is continuing to bring material assistance to Ukrainians who most need it. As of 2026, we have delivered $15 million in dual-use humanitarian aid to Ukraine, providing concrete necessities such as water filtration units, generators, sleeping bags, and MREs (meals ready to eat). At the end of last year, RDI delivered 150 New Year’s presents to children undergoing treatment at a Kharkiv oncology clinic. Most recently RDI supplied chemical heaters to help families endure the winter amid a severe energy and heating crisis.

We urge you to join us in standing for Ukrainian victory. The war is not over. The fight for Ukraine is the fight for freedom around the world.

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A note from Garry Kasparov: Perhaps you recently canceled a subscription to an oligarch-owned newspaper. Might I humbly suggest that you put that money toward supporting mission-driven media like The Next Move? I don’t receive a cent from your subscription fees—everything goes to supporting the work of The Next Move’s parent organization, the Renew Democracy Initiative. RDI is bringing political dissidents to tell their stories to students, business leaders, and public officials. Delivering life-saving humanitarian aid to frontline communities in Ukraine. And, of course, driving the conversation here on Substack. To help make the decision easier, we’re offering 30% off an annual subscription, now through March 4.

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This piece was originally delivered as a speech at the Ukrainian Institute of America on Tuesday, February 10, 2026 in New York City. The talk focused on the need to proactively support Ukrainian victory over Russia through the lens of Garry Kasparov’s new book, The World of Fake Values. More details about Garry’s book will be available in the next week.

Good evening. I want to thank the Ukrainian Institute of America for being our gracious hosts and partners for this event.

I want to speak with you tonight about The World of Fake Values. The World of Fake Values is the title of my new book, and it is the best description I have for a society that is too self-absorbed to defend its founding principles. It is the big picture look at the cauldron of different issues that have come together to produce the current dilemmas we face in democracy, diplomacy, and technology.

What are fake values?

Fake values are foolishness and short-sightedness masquerading as wisdom. Malice passed off as virtue. In essence: a scam.

We are all raised on stories of good and evil. No one reads The Lord of the Rings and comes out thinking that the Fellowship should have negotiated terms with Sauron.

Yet in the real world, we hear the appeals to accommodate evil. In this sense, Ukraine has become a litmus test for fake values.

In our stories, we like to imagine that we would render any aid to our heroes in order to help them fight evil. Yet in real life, when we demand that the US and other countries provide Ukraine with everything that it needs to win, academics, bureaucrats, and talking heads beseech us with buzzwords like “escalation.” Their fake theories, spelled out in lengthy essays and press releases, mean nothing in the face of real atrocities.

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In fantasy, we like to believe that we can tell you who is a good guy, and who is a bad guy. Yet in the real world, when we call to support Ukraine against the fascist Russian aggressors, we hear mealy-mouthed excuses about NATO expansion. Imagine arguing that Tolkien’s heroes encroached too close to Mordor’s borders—they forced the Dark Lord’s hand; he had no choice but to attack!

Now, some may argue that reality demands complex moral choices that fiction does not. They are wrong. When a movie ends, the lights go up and the credits roll and your opinion about the story has no real bearing on anyone. Reality, by contrast, means real consequences, and the worship of fake values can cost lives. It is a sad thing that real values are easier to spot in stories of make believe.

It was not always like this. In World War II, we could tell you who was on the right side, and who was not. In the Cold War, President Reagan decried the USSR as an “evil empire.”

But the fall of communism dulled our senses. Idle hands are the devil’s playthings, and without the specter of Soviet aggression, we—the Free World—lapsed into intellectual indulgence. We over-analyzed. We became afraid to call a spade a spade.

Moral relativism didn’t defeat Naziism and communism. A steadfast belief in freedom did. We forgot that.

America didn’t put a man on the moon by avoiding risk. You accepted sacrifice and faced the challenge head on—as President Kennedy said, “not because it is easy, but because it is hard.” We forgot that too.

Today, lost elections are stolen. Life-saving vaccines are poison. Free markets are evil and communism is the wave of the future. Ukraine, a nation fighting for its survival, is smeared as a “neo-Nazi regime.”

Yet we struggle to fight back against the lies because—above all—we became afraid of being right.

We need to break out of this ideological confusion and return to the self-confidence that ushered in nearly a century of unprecedented peace, prosperity, and innovation in the democratic world.

This is why I founded the Renew Democracy Initiative. To remind Americans that democracy needs a survival instinct. That what the United States, Ukraine, and other free countries have is worth cherishing and protecting. Through a program we call the Frontlines of Freedom, I and many other political dissidents meet with students, business leaders, and elected officials to share our stories and drive the point home. Our network includes over 100 democracy advocates from more than 40 different countries because the cause of liberty is interconnected. What happens in Ukraine affects what happens in Taiwan, Iran, and Venezuela. You cannot isolate one from the other.

RDI is also setting the record straight in the information war, fighting back against tired talking points with a positive belief in freedom on our publication The Next Move. But we don’t just talk. We are walking the walk: As of 2026, RDI has provided over $15 million in humanitarian aid to frontline communities in Ukraine.

This is a far-ranging fight. As I lay out in my book, it spans borders and industry, demanding bold action in diplomacy, security, and technological innovation. But returning to the path of real values starts in one place: Ukraine. It means providing our Ukrainian friends everything that they need to defeat Russia. Ukraine is the frontline of freedom. There is no clearer test of our commitment.

Slava Ukraini!

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I have a New Year’s resolution for you.

In 2026, I want you to trust dictators.

On the surface, it may seem like a strange thing coming from an advocate of freedom. Yet it’s my experience as a political dissident in Russia that informs this very recommendation.

Last week the National Security Archive released the transcripts of meetings between then-President George W. Bush and still-President Vladimir Putin, made public as the result of a Freedom of Information lawsuit.

The files go back nearly twenty-five years, and their contents are revealing.

Had President Bush and other American leaders paid closer attention to the imperial master plan Putin was articulating a quarter century ago, they might have been able to thwart the invasions of Ukraine and Georgia.

Consider this comment from Putin during a June 2001 summit in Slovenia.

…Russians gave up thousands of square kilometers of territory, voluntarily. Unheard of. Ukraine, part of Russia for centuries, given away. Kazakhstan, given away. The Caucasus too.

In other words, Ukraine is Russian property that Moscow was cheated out of. Bush never disputes Putin’s revisionist account of the collapse of the Soviet-Russian Empire.

In another newly-unveiled transcript from April 2008, we see Putin take an even more assertive tone with Bush. During a meeting at Putin’s Black Sea palace in Sochi, the Russian dictator affirms that:

[Ukraine] is not a nation built in a natural manner. It’s an artificial country created back in Soviet times.

And what if that upstart ex-colony, the “artificial” nation of Ukraine, were to join NATO?

Putin is about as blunt as he can be, telling Bush:

Russia would be creating problems there [in Ukraine] all the time.

(Russia, for what it’s worth, was already creating problems in Ukraine in 2008 with blatant political interference).

Four months later, Russia invaded Georgia—a trial run for the war in Ukraine.

Six years later, Russia invaded eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea (in that 2008 Sochi meeting, Putin had reminded Bush that Ukraine’s east was land “obtained…from Russia”).

Fourteen years later, Russia launched a brutal attack against the remainder of unoccupied Ukraine.

Days before the all-out assault, with Russian troops massed along the Ukrainian border, Putin delivered a meandering, ahistorical lecture on national television, repeating the same line he relayed to George W. Bush about Ukraine’s supposed status as an “artificial country.”

See what I mean about listening to dictators?

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We might forgive some of Bush’s early missteps because Putin was a relative unknown at the start of the twenty-first century. Yet the Russian regime’s intentions should have been unmistakable by the end of Bush’s tenure in office.

Bush’s successors have fewer excuses. Barack Obama saw the war in Georgia and still pursued a shameful “reset” in relations with the Kremlin. Joe Biden saw eight years of war in Ukraine and still slow-rolled life-saving military aid to Kyiv over manufactured fear of “escalation.”

And don’t get me started with Donald Trump.

We all hoped that Russia would change with the end of the Cold War. But the new bosses in Moscow quickly slammed the window of opportunity shut. In 1994, Boris Yeltsin took to war to prevent Chechen independence, firmly putting Moscow back on its traditional path of conquest and aggression. Putin made this clear from the beginning of his reign. Successive American presidents and European leaders closed their eyes and covered their ears.

Tyrants often lie about what they’re doing in the present, but they are quite open about their future plans. Aspiring autocrats were laying their blueprints out in the open as early as 1925, when a now-infamous Austrian published Mein Kampf. Nondemocratic rulers are weak—they need to inflate their stature to match their democratic counterparts and placate hungry publics. So they announce ambitious plans with a remarkable degree of transparency.

There’s a maxim that when someone tells you they want to kill you, you should believe them. That wisdom is very apt when it comes to authoritarians. In the New Year, trust the despots, demagogues, and dictators when they tell you what they are going to do.

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In geopolitics, timing is not a detail. It is the move.

When Vladimir Putin calls Donald Trump before Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it is not coincidence or courtesy. It is a deliberate effort to frame the conversation before Ukraine ever has a chance to make its case.

This happened back in October, when Putin and Trump chatted the day before Zelenskyy visited DC. Then, it happened again today, with another Trump-Putin call just before Zelenskyy arrived at Mar-A-Lago.

Two times in two months is enough for this phenomenon to deserve serious attention—and even describe what’s happening as a pattern.

It goes like this: Trump prepares to meet with Zelenskyy. Ukraine intends to argue for security guarantees, deterrence, and continued Western resolve. And just ahead of that meeting, Putin calls. Not after, when Ukrainian arguments might still be fresh, but before—when expectations can be set, doubts seeded, and the scope of “realistic” outcomes quietly narrowed.

The objective is not persuasion in the dramatic sense. It is conditioning.

By speaking with Trump in advance, Putin positions Russia’s interests as the backdrop against which Ukraine’s requests will be evaluated. Zelenskyy is then forced to argue uphill. The Ukrainian president must wage through pre-loaded nonsense (to use a family-friendly term) like Trump’s repeated insistence that “Russia wants peace” while Moscow continues its terror bombing of Ukrainian civilians. Just this week, Russia lobbed more missiles at Kyiv, killing innocent people and destroying civilian infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the Russian tyrant can frame Ukrainian demands as excessive before they are even presented. Providing Ukraine the aid it needs to repulse the Russian invaders becomes “escalatory.” Security guarantees with real teeth and clear red lines become “obstacles to peace.” Deterrence becomes “provocation.” None of this requires Russia to concede anything; it merely shifts the burden of justification onto Ukraine.

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The timing of these calls is especially significant given the ambiguity and weakness of the proposed Western security framework for Ukraine.

Ukraine—the country that actually wants peace—has been willing to play ball with a hostile United States, despite all of the obstacles. That is why Zelenskyy produced a 20-point plan based on his negotiations with the White House.

But Trump may have thrown out his own team’s homework, eschewing any of the specifics his American colleagues may have worked out with their Ukrainian counterparts.

For Putin, ambiguity is leverage. And ambiguity is exactly what Putin received in Florida. No timeline. No specifics.

Putin has always exploited impressionable American officials (take a look at the recently unveiled transcripts of George W. Bush’s deferential calls with Putin, or the extreme naivete displayed by Barack Obama in his “reset” with Russia).

After Georgia in 2008, Russia tested how far it could go without lasting consequences. After Crimea in 2014, it tested how much ambiguity the West would tolerate. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it tested how long outrage would last before fatigue set in. Each time, Moscow learned. Each time, it adjusted.

Trump makes each of his often-misguided predecessors look like Winston Churchill. Hell, he makes Churchill’s own infamous predecessor Neville Chamberlain look like a hard-nosed negotiator. At least Chamberlain was operating in terms of the public interest (albeit a fatal misinterpretation of that interest), not just flattery and personal attention.

In chess, the most decisive move is often not the attack, but the quiet preparation that constrains your opponent’s options before they even begin. Putin’s calls function in exactly this way. They narrow the field of what feels “reasonable” before Ukraine ever speaks.

This is why the weakness of the proposed security deal cannot be separated from the diplomacy surrounding it. A framework that lacks clarity invites manipulation. A process that tolerates ambiguity encourages pressure. And negotiations that allow an aggressor to shape the sequence reward precisely the behavior they should deter.

Putin keeps calling before Zelenskyy arrives because he understands that setting the board often matters more than playing the next move. If democratic leaders fail to recognize that logic, they risk drifting into outcomes shaped less by principle than by preparation.

In geopolitics, as in chess, losing control of the opening is often how the game is forfeit.

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Just in time for the holidays, a legion of priests and other representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church descended on Capitol Hill last week. These bearded visitors might evoke old Saint Nick, but there was nothing jolly about their appearance in the middle of the Christmas season.

American lawmakers need to recognize: These unholy men were in Washington on Kremlin business.

Predictably, the Muscovite delegation told anyone who would listen that Ukraine persecutes Christians.

It is propaganda that is as well-worn as it is false.

The crux of the Kremlin allegations is that Kyiv has cracked down on the Russian Orthodox Church. Russian dictator Vladimir Putin summed up the claim earlier this month, saying that “The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine is practically banned.”

Ukraine is actually one of the most religious countries to come out of the former Soviet Union. More Ukrainians than Russians identify as Orthodox Christians.

Before February 2022, church attendance in Ukraine was already five times higher than in Russia. Since the full-scale invasion, that religiosity has only intensified, with more and more Ukrainians showing up for services. It really is hard to find an atheist on the frontlines.

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Now, while Ukraine respects Orthodox Christians, the Ukrainian government did ban the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2024. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church split from its Russian counterpart five years earlier.

Calling those Ukrainian actions “persecution” is deliberate misdirection on Moscow’s part. Russia is exploiting Americans’—especially American conservatives’ and Christians’—commitment to religious liberty by telling an incomplete story.

Here in America, church and state are blessedly separate. But the Russian Orthodox priesthood is an extension of the Russian government.

Under the Russian Empire, the Tsar was the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and in communist times, it became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the KGB. It remains so today.

In fact, Patriarch Kirill, the current leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, started working for the KGB in the 1970s—around the same time Vladimir Putin did. Kirill is not some apolitical monk. He is a billionaire supporter of Putin who’s fond of luxury watches and fancy cars. The patriarch even sanctioned the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a “holy war.” Russian Orthodox priests have supplied information to Russian forces about Ukrainian troop movements. This is an institution with a lot of blood on its hands and an indispensable part of Putin’s regime, which is actively at war with Ukraine.

Kyiv clamping down on the activities of a Kremlin-backed church is no more anti-Christian than America’s war with al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists was anti-Muslim.

Put simply: Ukraine doesn’t persecute Christians. It fights back against Russian operatives. Putin tries to portray himself as a defender of Christendom, but the Russian tyrant and his loyal Orthodox clergy are just taking advantage of a pliant American audience to shift the focus off of their own record of wanton destruction in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has already claimed hundreds of thousands of Christian lives. As of June 2025, Russian troops had destroyed or damaged 670 churches and other places of worship in Ukraine.

Back in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s regime regularly goes after non-Orthodox Christian denominations. Protestants, Baptists, and others face arrests, fines, and general abuse. Russian authorities spent years pressuring Yevgeniy Peresvetov, an Evangelical pastor, to become an intelligence agent; after repeated refusals, Peresvetov was deported. His story is sadly not unique.

The claim that majority-Orthodox Ukraine abuses Orthodox Christians belongs to the same family of obvious untruths as the notion that Ukraine (with its Jewish president) is a neo-Nazi state. Meanwhile, with Putin’s overt persecution of non-Orthodox Christians, we see that every Russian allegation is in fact an admission.

Still, some members of Congress—namely Anna Paulina Luna, Eli Crane, and Derrick Van Orden—are eagerly amplifying these Russian lies. They join other Kremlin-aligned actors like Tucker Carlson, who have taken up the cause of “persecuted” Ukrainian Christians.

Yet there are others—including prominent Republicans—who have called out the Russian government’s Church-run influence campaign.

Last week, Iowa’s Chuck Grassley affirmed unambiguously on the Senate floor that “The Russian Orthodox Church is a leading perpetrator of the persecution of fellow Orthodox believers, as well as Catholics, Evangelicals and others.”

Congressman Joe Wilson of South Carolina has even suggested a federal investigation to determine whether Moscow is using Russian Orthodox churches in the US for malign purposes. Such an inquiry would be a welcome and important step in rolling back Kremlin influence operations.

Anyone with doubts about the situation of religious freedom in Russia and Ukraine should look to conservative stalwarts like Grassley and Wilson for moral clarity on this issue.

The Russian government will always cry religious persecution when its black-robed agents are subjected to scrutiny.

But the ones abusing religious freedom are not leaders in Kyiv who go after agents of a dangerous aggressor or members of Congress who call for exposing their US-based enablers. They are the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church itself, appropriating the trappings of the faith in order to advance a campaign of genocidal war against their Ukrainian neighbors and ostensible co-religionists. I cannot think of more un-Christian behavior.

One of the most renowned Soviet dissident rockers, the late Igor Talkov, took aim at Russia’s historic perversion of religion in his song “Globus”:

“Show me the kind of country where the temples are boarded up,” Talkov quips, “Where a priest hides a KGB officer’s epaulettes under his robes.”

Show me such a country, indeed. That country is Russia, and it must be stopped.

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The new world order is here and it doesn’t make a whole lot of sense.

There are whispers in DC that President Donald Trump is looking to sideline the G7—the grouping of seven major industrialized democracies—and replace it with what the beltway press is calling the “Core 5”: the United States, Russia, China, India, and Japan.

Notably lost in the G7-to-C5 transition are five of the other free countries that make up the old alignment: Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Canada. Thrown in are two dictatorships (Russia and China) and a deeply flawed pro-Russian democracy (India).

Japan—a consolidated democracy and longtime US ally—is the only G7 survivor and, on the surface, the oddest inclusion. It can really only be chalked up to personal preference. Trump likes the Japanese, though, as recent events have shown, not enough to actually defend them from an aggressive Beijing.

Why such a cockeyed assortment?

The answer is twofold:

First—unlike the democracies of Europe—Trump has a personal affinity for these four nations and their leaders.

Second, and perhaps more importantly in Trump’s mind, they’re big.

Here, Trump’s interview from last week with POLITICO’s Dasha Burns is instructive.

On Russia and Ukraine, Burns asks Trump: “Which country right now is in the stronger negotiating position?”

To which Trump replies:

Well, there can be no question about it. It’s Russia. It’s a much bigger country.

Russia is bigger than Ukraine. What novel insight!

The president goes on to repeat:

Russia has the upper... upper hand. And they always did. They’re much bigger. They’re much stronger in that sense.

This is basically the same argument put forward by foreign policy “realists” like Professor John Mearsheimer, who are keen to remind all of us that Russia is larger than Ukraine and that there are more Russians than Ukrainians.

Too many people still treat Mearsheimer as a serious academic for making the same facile points that Trump is rightly ridiculed over.

Like many self-described “realists,” Trump and Mearsheimer are capable of only the most basic geopolitical analysis: Recognizing which countries are big, and which countries are even bigger. But they struggle with math—specifically, addition.

And addition is what makes the Free World work.

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Russia only seems so big when you look at America’s democratic allies in isolation from one another. Yet the sum total of the democratic alliance’s economic and military might is several orders of magnitude greater than Russia’s.

Americans should be the first to recognize that size doesn’t always matter. This country was born out of a victory over the largest empire on the planet. With the help of allies like the French, Spanish, and Dutch, the colonists were able to challenge and defeat the eighteenth century’s premier superpower, Great Britain.

It is much the same today. Ukraine is only smaller than Russia if it is cut off from its natural partners. The support of the United States and an active NATO in Europe and allies like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea in Asia are sufficient counterweights to any would-be hegemon.

The Free World is wanting for willpower, not resources.

If Trump’s C5 materializes, it will be a departure from the democratic coalition’s strength in numbers. It actually looks a lot like the Russian- and Chinese-backed regional blocs, which no one has ever paid much mind to because they’ve always lagged far behind Western institutions.

Imperfect as it is, the EU forged a real political-economic union, innovative common currency, and shared institutions. Cheap imitators like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian Economic Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization mostly do photo-ops for dictators while papering over the deep conflicts between their members (like India versus Pakistan at the SCO or Armenia’s isolation from its neighbors in the Russian-sponsored groupings).

So it will be with the C5. The Core 5 will give Trump the image he craves of a big man at the head of a big table. But an image is just that. On substance, the C5 cannot resolve China’s conflicts with Japan or India—or, frankly, Russia and China’s deeper disputes with the United States. It is a poor substitute for Washington’s lucrative partnerships with other free countries, and may actually end up harming them.

The question is: Why such obvious self-sabotage in front of the entire world?

I’ll let you answer that one.

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Last week, I spoke at the Halifax International Security Forum. I had a few choice words for NATO and the US when it comes to the Western response (or non-response) to Russia’s ongoing genocidal war in Ukraine.

Those comments have gone viral over the past week. Here’s what I had to say (edited very lightly for clarity):

This is the best show Putin can hope for. Not a single straight answer.

It’s not about how many weapons you have, ammunition… it’s: are you willing to fight and die?

Oh, it’s nice, you have a Canadian-led brigade in Latvia. What are the orders for this brigade? Will they shoot if Russians cross the border?

We know the answer. It will take ages to negotiate.

I still didn’t hear a clear response to this.

I can’t even imagine this. How can we discuss seriously the deal made by Trump’s business partner [Witkoff]? It’s a real estate deal to enrich Trump’s family and sell Ukraine. How can we seriously discuss that Ukraine will have to give up fortifications that are saving Europe?

Ah, we’re celebrating NATO! NATO is not strong. NATO doesn’t exist.

It’s a fake. It’s N-A-T-O, four letters.

The reason you are still sitting here and celebrating it: Ukraine is dying every minute. It’s a massive sacrifice. If not for Ukraine, if not for Ukraine standing in front of Russia, Russian tanks would be in Poland already.

You all suggested that Ukraine would give up. You offered Zelensky a ride. And he said, “I don’t need a ride, I need ammunition.”

Four years, Ukraine is fighting for the whole of Europe.

NATO was built to fight only one war. Not to go to Afghanistan, not to go to Syria. One war: To save free Europe from Russian aggression.

Ukraine is the only country that is fighting this war, and we’re still discussing: Should we include them or not?

Ukraine is the only country that is fulfilling NATO’s destiny. And we owe them everything.

“Oh, let’s sacrifice them.”

I don’t know how to explain this choice. As a Russian, I also feel guilty. That’s why I cannot tell Zelenskyy to show Trump the middle finger. But again, we have how many senators here? Are you going to tell Donald Trump that he cannot do that?

You have 85 [senators]. 85 is more than two-thirds, yes? If I’m out of 100. So, yes. How come that, you know, this bill is still sitting somewhere on the floor of the Senate, and it’s not still being done? Putin, Xi Jinping, all others, they are celebrating it.

And by the way, Russia has North Koreans, they have Cubans, they have Africans, volunteers, and we’re still talking about escalation?

We have everything—military, political, economic power on our side—and we’re still losing the war. Thanks to Ukraine, Russia is not fulfilling Putin’s dream of restoring the Russian Empire.

But, if, god forbid, Ukraine is forced to make this deal, then, it’s very clear: Putin will realize his dream.

And then, guys, you are next, but you are not willing to fight.

My comments—especially the remark that “NATO doesn’t exist”—touched a nerve with critics and supporters alike.

I stand by what I said, and I’d like to expand upon it a bit.

As a formal entity, yes, there is an institution called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The terms of international accords are spelled out in great length and detail. But do they mean anything?

I often return to the formulation set forth by Lord Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general, laying out the alliance’s core purpose: To keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.

(Readers may recall that I revisited Ismay’s quote back in August when the buzz was all about “NATO-style” security guarantees for Ukraine, whatever that means).

The Soviet Union’s zombie successor is in free Europe—on the ground in Ukraine and with deep influence in NATO capitals from Washington to Budapest, Berlin, and Bratislava.

The Americans are out of Europe. The MAGA wing of the political spectrum actively wants out, and is doing everything possible to isolate the US from its democratic allies. But the non-MAGA wing is not guiltless. The invasion of Ukraine started on Joe Biden’s watch, and his administration responded to a Russian blitzkrieg with all the vigor of a garden snail.

And that last part: When Lord Ismay talked about keeping “the Germans down,” he wanted to prevent the rise of a hegemonic empire on the continent in the mold of Hitler’s Reich. Russia is abusing Western indecision and proceduralism to grab territory from its neighbors just as the Nazis did in Central Europe ninety years ago. Meanwhile, democratic Germany is unwilling to lead.

Judged by Lord Ismay’s standard, does the NATO alliance meaningfully exist? Why isn’t NATO collectively standing with the one country fulfilling its founding mission?

For too long, the West has chosen comfort over action, offering words and gestures to Kyiv while the Ukrainian people die every day in a desperate battle to hold the frontlines.

Yes, there was anger in my voice at Halifax. I spoke with a level of indignation appropriate to watching a free country sold out to a fascist aggressor. If the Free World allows its historical purpose to be watered down by caveats, then “never again” will quickly become “again and again.”

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Last week ended on a high note: I won a rematch against my fellow World Chess Champion Vishy Anand, and my friend and RDI Hero of Democracy María Corina Machado was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Call them small wins, but we don’t have enough good news these days. To celebrate, I’m giving away three chess sets, autographed by yours truly. Anyone signed up as a premium subscriber by October 31, 2025 will be automatically entered to win.¹

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Victory requires understanding the board. For Ukraine, that means leveling an uneven playing field. For three-and-a-half years, Ukraine has had to overcome a numerical deficit against the much larger Russian military. Since Donald Trump returned to office, the Ukrainians have also needed to conquer a diplomatic disadvantage.

Today’s meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy showed that no matter who speaks to the US president last, Vladimir Putin always gets the final word. Even though this most recent US-Ukraine summit looked chummy on the surface, Trump’s focus was clearly still on his Thursday call with the Russian dictator.

There’s no way around it: Putin takes precedence over Zelenskyy in Trump’s mind. No grinning photo ops are going to change that. But this handicap doesn’t mean Ukraine has to lose. Kyiv and its allies still have options.

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First, let’s consider the events of the past 24 hours.

On Thursday, Trump took a phone call with Putin. Trump claims the Russian leader congratulated him on “the Great Accomplishment of Peace in the Middle East.” A bit of an oversell, but I have no doubt that Putin showered him with praise for the Gaza ceasefire. The old KGB hand remembers his training in psychological manipulation well.

The big takeaway from that call was Putin’s proposal of a summit with Zelenskyy, Trump, and Hungarian petite-despot Viktor Orban in Budapest. Now, Hungary is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Russia, about as neutral a territory as a toilet stall in the Kremlin. And at least in the bathroom, Zelenskyy might have a chance at catching Putin with his pants down.

Zelenskyy came to the White House today seeking Tomahawk missiles. He didn’t have to weather a meltdown of the kind Trump and JD Vance threw back in February, but he didn’t get his missiles either. Trump’s focus was, predictably, with Putin in Budapest.

The offer of a summit in the Hungarian capital is clearly a trap. Zelenskyy would find himself outnumbered three-to-one.

Here is the thing: That summit doesn’t have to happen.

Hungary is landlocked. It is impossible to get into its airspace without passing through a European Union member. Putin would need to fly over those countries to reach his Danube destination. The EU (and the United States) maintains a ban on Russian air traffic as a result of Moscow’s criminal war in Ukraine.

It would only take one EU nation to insist upon enforcing the ban to throw the whole Budapest bash off. And it is critical that the union’s member states step up.

Trump’s plan for a meeting with Putin in Budapest is an affront to European sovereignty. It would show that an American president can, by diktat, overrule European decisions like the Russian flight ban. The Ukrainians and their supporters need to remind their friends in the EU of this.

The Trump administration had to make a special exception to America’s flight ban in order to facilitate the embarrassment that was this summer’s Alaska summit. But that shame rests with America, and the Europeans don’t need to do the same.

There’s a fleeting chance that a gutsy stand like this might even play well with Trump. The American president doesn’t respect much of anything, but he does seem to appreciate strength.

Part of Trump’s contempt for America’s European allies stems from his understanding—not entirely unfounded—that the continent is weak on Russia, dependent upon Washington, and unable to stand on its own.

Yes, even Putin-friendly Trump has called out the Europeans for being weak on Russia. Consider this comment by the president in 2018.

They want to protect against Russia and yet they pay billions of dollars to Russia, and we’re the schmucks paying for the whole thing.

He wasn’t wrong.

Trump puts Putin first because in his overly-simplistic worldview, Russia is strong and defiant, and Europe is weak and compliant. The Europeans have a chance to prove him wrong—and help Ukraine in the process.

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